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I. INTRODUCTION
The civil liberties decisions of the 1981-82 Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals term fall under four major topics: first amendment, due
process, employment discrimination and general enforcement issues-
e.g., attorney fee awards, implied right of action and remedies, interre-
lationship between civil rights statutes, immunities and standing. Most
of the first amendment issues examine the relationship between a gov-
ernment employer and its employees. Here the court generally upheld
the first amendment rights of employees and attempted to clarify the
relative burdens imposed in litigating first amendment retaliatory dis-
charge suits.
The majority of the procedural due process cases represent an ap-
plication of the two-step analysis required by Mathews v. Eldridge.'
More specifically, they address the adequacy of the process rather than
the question of whether there was a protected interest. An exception is
Ellis v. Hamilton,2 one of the first attempts by the Seventh Circuit to
apply the troublesome Supreme Court decision in Parratt v. Taylor.3
While the result in Ellis may be appropriate, the application of Parratt
is somewhat questionable.
Employment discrimination cases-involving race, sex, age and
alienage-touch upon the different burdens of plaintiffs and defendants
in disproportionate impact and disparate treatment situations, retalia-
tion by employers against employees who take steps to enforce Title
VII, the constitutionality of the age discrimination provision in the con-
text of a challenge based on the tenth amendment, and the federal gov-
ernment's right to restrict the employment opportunities of aliens. The
retaliation cases raise some interesting variations, such as a hospital
employer's right to discharge an employee whose continued employ-
ment is violently opposed by the American Nazi Party.4
Several interesting enforcement issues were decided. The court
continued to address questions of both entitlement and amount under
civil rights statutes providing for attorney fees. The availability of sec-
1. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
2. 669 F.2d 510 (7th Cir. 1982).
3. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
4. EEOC v. St. Anne's Hosp. of Chicago, Inc., 664 F.2d 128 (7th Cir. 1981).
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tion 1983 to enforce federal statutes which fail to provide full relief was
decided in the context of the Education of All Handicapped Children
Act with a ruling adverse to the plaintiff.5 Again the court faced the
question of whether a remedy should be implied under a statute, this
time in the context of a claim for damages under Title IX. With a
strong dissent, the court concluded Congress did not intend to provide
damages.6 In a very significant case, Tidwell v. Schweiker,7 the court
held that case or controversy principles developed by the Supreme
Court in the context of class suits involving mootness were applicable
to the question of standing raised in a class action.
An effort was made to at least mention all of the decisions. Some
of them, however, were relegated to a footnote. In addition, an effort
was made to incorporate recent decisions of the Supreme Court wher-
ever applicable and other federal appellate court decisions, particularly
where there is a conflict among the circuits. Some of the issues con-
fronted-e.g., the scope and application of Parratt and the availability
of section 1983 to enforce federal statutes-are the subject of much liti-
gation today and could easily provide sufficient material for separate
articles.
II. FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES
This term the Seventh Circuit decided several interesting cases in-
volving the first amendment freedoms of government employees. The
court was generally quite protective of the employees' rights holding
that they have a right to campaign against their incumbent employer
without facing subsequent dismissal, 8 that their right to join unions
cannot be unreasonably restricted by department regulations,9 that mi-
nority unions cannot be denied the right of access to communication
channels guaranteed to majority unions,' 0 and that they have the right
to academic freedom.1' The court further protected the right of gov-
ernment employees through its allocation of burdens of proof in first
amendment retaliatory discharge cases.12
5. Anderson v. Thompson, 658 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1981).
6. Lieberman v. Univ. of Chicago, 660 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1981).
7. 677 F.2d 560 (7th Cir. 1982).
8. Bart v. Telford, 677 F.2d 622 (7th Cir. 1982).
9. Mescall v. Rochford, 655 F.2d Ill (7th Cit. 1981).
10. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n v. Hohlt, 652 F.2d 1286 (7th Cir. 1981).
II. Dow Chemical Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1982).
12. Egger v. Phillips, 669 F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 1982); Nekolny v. Painter, 653 F.2d 1164 (7th
Cir. 1981).
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A. Strict Scrutiny Analysis Required Where First
Amendment Rights are Implicated
As to the substantive issues decided by the court, it generally took
the position that any type of restriction on first amendment rights must
be subjected to strict scrutiny analysis. The court reflected this position
in three decisions. First, in the case of Mescall v. Rochford,13 the court
invalidated Rule 54A of the Rules and Regulations of the Chicago Po-
lice Department which prohibited police officers from joining or retain-
ing membership "in any labor organization whose membership is not
exclusively limited to full-time law enforcement officers.' 4 The de-
fendants had argued that the rule was justified because affiliation with
other unions accepting non-police officers could result in a potential
conflict of interest situation in which a union police officer acts in a
labor dispute involving a non-police officer union to which he be-
longs. 15 The Seventh Circuit, as well as the district court below, re-
jected these arguments asserting that any restrictions on the exercise of
first amendment freedoms had to be strictly scrutinized: "[tihe state
must show that the limits imposed serve a substantial and legitimate
state interest, and that such purpose is achieved in the least restrictive
manner."'
6
Applying this strict analysis the Seventh Circuit concluded that the
provision was unconstitutional for several reasons. First, it was over-
broad,' 7 in that it forbade membership in organizations where no po-
tential conflict could arise, e.g., organizations which did not even
permit strikes. In addition, the regulation was invalid because it identi-
fied groups in which the membership was forbidden. The court found
this to be both an impermissible as well as a drastic means to achieve
the government purpose.' 8 Finally the court noted that other excep-
tions written into the rule, i.e., exceptions permitting membership in
unions which admit non-police officers when that membership was re-
lated to approved secondary employment, further illustrated the arbi-
trariness of the rule since the same potential of dual allegiance would
be raised under such circumstances.' 9 In short, the court concluded
that the purpose of the rule was not sufficient to outweigh the first
13. 655 F.2d Ill (7th Cir. 1981).
14. Id at 112.
15. Id
16. Id, citing Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
17. Id
18. Id at 113.
19. Id
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amendment rights of the plaintiffs to be free from arbitrary and over-
broad restraints.
The court applied similar strict scrutiny analysis in the case of
Perry Local Educators' Association v. Hohlt.20 The issue involved the
constitutionality of a collective bargaining agreement between a teach-
ers' union and the school board that permitted the union to use the
school district's internal mail system while at the same time compelling
the school district to deny that right to competing unions. The district
court, following the consensus of the federal courts that have dealt with
the issue,2' upheld the provision as not violating first amendment
rights. Granting summary judgment for the defendants, the trial court
held that "the restrictions placed upon the use of facilities not open to
the general public. . . are so inconsequential that. . .[they] cannot be
considered an infringement of first amendment rights of free speech." 22
The court proceeded to apply rational basis analysis to plaintiffs' equal
protection claim, finding that the exclusive access policy was rationally
related to the goal of preserving labor peace within the school system.
The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the provision violated
both the equal protection clause as well as the first amendment. The
court began by listing several Supreme Court cases in which it was
found that the first amendment did place a wide variety of restrictions
on government labor practices.23 It concluded that the government's
interest in conducting its operations efficiently would justify restrictions
on first amendment rights only if such were "reasonably necessary to
that end."24 The court found it critical that the rule did not evenhand-
edly exclude all private communication from the government facility,
but rather it denied access to certain groups while granting such to
other groups. Thus, the issue here was not absolute access, but equal
access. 25 This required a heightened standard of review: "discrimina-
tory treatment of speech on the basis of its content or on the basis of the
identity of the speaker usually requires rigorous scrutiny because it pre-
sumptively violates the first amendment's primary and overriding pro-
20. 652 F.2d 1286 (7th Cir. 1981). The Supreme Court recently reversed this ruling. 103 S.
Ct. 948 (1983). See explanatory note, infra page 473.
21. See Connecticut State Fed'n of Teachers v. Board of Educ. Members, 538 F.2d 471 (2d
Cir. 1976); Memphis Am. Fed'n of Teachers Local 2032 v. Board of Educ., 534 F.2d 699 (6th Cit.
1976).
22. 652 F.2d at 1289, quoting Connecticut State Fed'n of Teachers v. Board of Educ. Mem-
bers, 538 F.2d 471, 478 (2d Ci. 1976).
23. See cases collected at 652 F.2d at 1291-92 n.16-25.
24. Id at 1292.
25. Id at 1300.
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scription against censorship." 26 Although noting some departure from
this rule with regard to "subject matter provisions," 27 the court prop-
erly concluded that nothing but the most exacting scrutiny has been
applied to a content or speaker restriction that substantially tended to
favor the advocacy of one point of view on a given issue.28 Since the
access policy adopted by the defendants here did favor a particular
viewpoint on labor relations in the school system, it had to be "rigor-
ously scrutinized." The court further held that strict scrutiny analysis
was mandated by the equal protection claim, since free speech is a fun-
damental right and discrimination between speech or speakers impli-
cates that right. 29
The court proceeded to reject the various justifications asserted by
the defendants as to both claims. First, it rejected the position adopted
by the Second Circuit30 that the standard of scrutiny should be low
because the communications of minority unions were thought to be "of
limited public interest." The court noted that although a few recent
Supreme Court decisions have suggested a "two-level" theory of the
first amendment, 31 it distinguished those cases as involving "virtually
idealess near-obscenity speech on the fringe of first amendment protec-
tion."' 32 Here the minority union's criticism of the majority union and
its efforts to persuade teachers to enter its ranks were classified as near
the "apex" of any hierarchy of protected speech. 33 The court also re-
jected the contention that the existence of alternative ways to commu-
nicate with the teachers satisfied the first amendment. It noted that the
existence of alternative channels of communication is significant only
to the extent that those channels are as effective as the restricted chan-
nels.34 Here the court concluded that the alternatives were not as effec-
26. Id at 1293.
27. This term refers to content discrimination based on the subject matter of expression in a
particular setting. The government may forbid an entire subject matter rather than singling out
one particular point of view. This is said to be a more acceptable form of government regulation.
For example, the Supreme Court applied a relatively deferential standard of review to rules for-
bidding all political expression in a military base. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976). Other
examples are discussed by the court. See 652 F.2d at 1294-1295. The issue of subject matter
neutrality was analyzed in last year's survey. See Bodensteiner & Levinson, Civil Liberties, 58
CHICAGO KENT L. REV. 270, 272 (1982).
28. 652 F.2d at 1296.
29. Id.
30. Connecticut State Fed'n of Teachers v. Board of Educ. Members, 538 F.2d 471, 481 (2d
Cir. 1976).
31. See FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (plurality opinion); Young v. American
Mini Theaters, Inc. 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (plurality opinion).
32. 652 F.2d at 1299.
33. Id
34. Id
408
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tive, either being more expensive, more cumbersome, or less able to
reach teachers swiftly and effectively.
As to the state's argument that the rule was necessary to insure
labor peace, the court concluded that this policy was both under and
over inclusive.3 5 The state argued that the majority union's use of the
mail system had to be exclusive in light of its special legal duties. How-
ever, the exclusive use was not limited to messages related to these spe-
cial duties and the rule did not prohibit other organizations with no
special duties to the teachers from using the system. No evidence had
been introduced to indicate how granting equal access to other unions
would impose additional expenses on the school district or would inter-
fere with the majority union's execution of its duties as bargaining rep-
resentative. In general the defendants could point to no specific
interference with school operations that would result from the use of
the mail system by the plaintiffs. Applying this searching analysis, the
Seventh Circuit rejected the precedent established in the other courts of
appeals and struck the provision. 36
A final case discussing the standard of review that should be uti-
lized where first amendment rights are implicated is Dow Chemical Co.
v. Allen .37 The issue arose in a case involving the district court's obli-
gation to compel through administrative subpoenas the disclosure of
information held by university professors. Dow Chemical Company
was threatened with a possible ban on certain herbicides it manufac-
tured and it wanted the university research information to use at the
cancellation proceedings. In balancing the need for disclosure against
the burden of compliance, the court stated that it was important to
weigh the issue of academic freedom, 38 even though the district court
had not discussed the point. It found, based on Supreme Court prece-
dent, that in order to prevail over academic freedom, "the interest of
government must be strong and the extent of intrusion carefully
limited. '39
35. Id at 1300.
36. Note that in addition to the two court of appeals decisions cited in note 21, supra, the
Seventh Circuit listed a long line of district court decisions which reached the same conclusion.
652 F.2d at 1289 n.6. In fact the Seventh Circuit found only one case holding unconstitutional the
school district's refusal to grant a minority union access to teachers' mailboxes or other facilities
while granting such privileges to a majority union. See Teachers Local 399 v. Michigan City Area
Schools, No. 72-S-94 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 24, 1973), vacated on other grounds, 499 F.2d 115 (7th Cir.
1974).
37. 672 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir. 1982).
38. Id at 1274.
39. Id at 1275. The court cited Justice Frankfurter's analysis in Sweezy v. New Hampshire,
354 U.S. 234 (1957), in which he stated that the government cannot intrude into academic freedom
except for reasons "that are both exigent and obviously compelling." Id at 262.
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The court held that compliance with the broad administrative sub-
poena sought here would have a chilling effect on the exercise of aca-
demic freedom and that the burden of compliance would not be
insubstantial. 4° Although noting that academic freedom is obviously
not absolute, it concluded that it should figure "into the legal calcula-
tion of whether forced disclosure would be reasonable." It then found
little to justify this intrusion into university life "which would risk sub-
stantially chilling the exercise of academic freedom."'4 1
The same emphasis on chilling the exercise of first amendment
freedoms was the basis for reversal in two other Seventh Circuit deci-
sions. In Bart v. Te/ford,4 2 the court upheld the mayor's action of forc-
ing plaintiff to take a leave of absence from her job while running for
public office. 43 However, it noted that the plaintiff was subsequently
harassed for expressing views. The court ruled that if the harassment
would have deterred "a person of ordinary firmness" from engaging in
protected speech, it raised a viable first amendment claim.44
40. 672 F.2d at 1276.
41. Id at 1277. Note that the Fifth Circuit recently rejected an evidentiary privilege based
on academic freedom. In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied 102 S. Ct. 2904
(1982). For a critical analysis of this conclusion, see Comment, A Privilege Based on Academic
Freedom Does Not Insulate a University from Disclosing Confidential Employment Information, 52
Miss. L.J. 493 (1982).
42. 677 F.2d 622 (7th Cir. 1982).
43. Id. The court held that the first amendment does not confer a right to run for public
office. Since the restriction on plaintiffs candidacy was neutral with regard to first amendment
values, the court found it indistinguishable from Supreme Court decisions upholding the Hatch
Act and similar state restrictions on partisan political activities of employees. It concluded that, as
a matter of law, the policy of compelling public employees to take a leave of absence if they run
for public office is sufficiently important to the effective functioning of the government to justify
the impairment of freedom of speech. The latter was found to be "indirect and probably very
slight," while the benefits in preserving order, discipline, and efficiency in public employment
were found to be great. ld at 625.
The Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in Clements v. Fashing, 102 S. Ct. 2836
(1982), upholding a Texas constitutional provision requiring the automatic resignation of certain
office holders who become candidates for other state or federal offices. The Court also upheld a
provision requiring certain officials to complete their current terms of office before they could be
eligible to serve in the state legislature. Relying in part on Civil Service Comm'n v. National
Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973) and Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973), the
Supreme Court held that the state interests were sufficient to warrant the "de minimus" interfer-
ence with first amendment rights in candidacy. 102 S. Ct. at 2848.
See also Morial v. Judiciary Comm'n of State of La., 565 F.2d 295 (5th Cir. 1977) (upholding
a Louisiana law which required judges to resign their positions before announcing their candidacy
for public office). Contra, Vincent v. Maeras, 447 F. Supp. 775 (S.D. Ill. 1978) (a communications
technician in the sheriffs office, seeking the sheriffs position, may have been improperly required
to take a leave of absence; the plaintiff showed probable success on the merits and therefore was
granted preliminary injunctive relief).
44. 677 F.2d at 625. The court noted that although the effect on freedom of speech may be
small where a public employee is subjected to harassment and ridicule, there is no justification for
harassing people for exercising their constitutional rights. Thus, the effect need not be great in
order to be actionable.
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In all of these cases the Seventh Circuit thus reaffirmed basic first
amendment principles, according free speech and association the pro-
tection which is critical to our constitutional system. The fact that the
court did this in face of some rather discouraging signals from the
Supreme Court45 and other federal courts,46 makes the decisions even
more noteworthy.
B. Pleading and Proving Retaliatory Discharge
In two decisions the Seventh Circuit dealt with the procedural as-
pects of pleading and proving a retaliatory discharge suit. In Egger v.
Phillips,47 a former FBI agent brought suit against his supervisor seek-
ing damages based on allegations that his transfer and subsequent dis-
charge were taken in violation of his constitutional rights. He alleged
that during the course of his investigation of gambling operations in
Indianapolis he became suspicious of a fellow agent, believing the
agent was "on the take," and that his efforts to bring this to the atten-
tion of FBI superiors caused the defendant to unconstitutionally retali-
ate against him.
The Seventh Circuit held that the district court erred in granting
summary judgment in favor of the defendant supervisor.4 8 It found the
record sufficient to create a genuine issue of fact as to the actual moti-
vation for the attempted transfer of the plaintiff. Furthermore, the
court concluded that although a state employer does have a legitimate
interest in maintaining discipline and preserving harmony among co-
workers, the record was insufficient to conclude as a matter of law that
plaintiff's actions were so abrasive or disruptive of office routine as to
be denied first amendment protection.49
The decision is significant because it adopts the position of other
courts of appeals regarding the inappropriateness of granting summary
45. See TmiBE, FIRST AMENDMENT TRENDS: WHEN PIGEONHOLING ENDANGERS THE PIG-
EON, 3 THE SUPREME COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 1980-1981 at 229-34. See also cases
cited, supra note 3 1.
46. See, e.g., cases cited supra note 21.
47. 669 F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 1982).
48. Id at 504.
49. Id at 503. The court also rejected defendant's argument that he was entitled to summary
judgment on the ground of qualified immunity. Again the court found that this was a question of
fact which had to be determined by a jury, i.e., defendant is entitled to prevail on an immunity
defense only if he acted for reasons other than in retaliation for plaintiff's exercise of his first
amendment rights. If first amendment retaliation was a motivation, the defendant was not pro-
tected in light of the clear Supreme Court precedent upholding the first amendment rights of
government employees. Id at 504.
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judgment in a retaliatory discharge case.50 Although the Supreme
Court in Mt. Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle5 1
placed the initial burden on the plaintiff to establish that his constitu-
tionally protected conduct played a motivating role in the employer's
decisions,5 2 the Seventh Circuit held it sufficient that the evidence sub-
mitted by the plaintiff raises an inference that he would not have been
transferred but for his first amendment activity.5 3 It criticizes the dis-
trict court for weighing the evidence regarding plaintiffs activities since
issues of motive were involved.5 4 Further, the district court's finding
that plaintiffs activity "substantially contributed to creating havoc in
the Indianapolis office" was found to be an inappropriate conclusion
for the court to reach, without submitting the issue to a jury.55
Issues regarding burdens and standards of proof in retaliation suits
were further clarified in the decision of Nekolny v. Painter.5 6 Plaintiffs
alleged that they lost their jobs because they had campaigned for the
Township Supervisor's opponent in an election. The court specifically
rejected defendant's argument that a plaintiff must show his protected
activity was the sole reason for the defendant's unfavorable action.5 7
Although Mt. Healthy made it clear that the plaintiffs burden is only to
establish that the unfavorable conduct was motivated in part by pro-
tected speech, 58 the defendant tried to distinguish that case in light of
the fact that the firings here were for partisan political reasons.5 9 Re-
jecting this distinction, the court found the defendant was sufficiently
protected by imposing on the plaintiff the initial burden of proving that
the protected conduct was "a substantial or motivating factor." 60 Be-
cause of this requirement, "a disgruntled employee fired for legitimate
reasons would not be able to satisfy his burden merely by showing that
he carried the political card of the opposition party or that he favored
the defendant's opponent in the election."' 61 Here the court found the
50. See, e.g., Kim v. Koppin State College, 662 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1981); Nathanson v.
United States, 630 F.2d 1260 (8th Cir. 1980).
51. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
52. Id at 287.
53. 669 F.2d at 503.
54. Id
55. Id at 503.
56. 653 F.2d 1164 (7th Cir. 1981).
57. Id at 1168.
58. 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977).
59. 653 F.2d at 1167.
60. Id at 1168.
61. Id The concurring judge, while agreeing that Mi. Healthy requires the defendant to bear
the burden of persuasion once plaintiff has made a prima facie showing that political activity was
a "motivating factor" in the discharge, argued this standard is inappropriate in partisan political
termination decisions. Noting that Mi. Healthy did not address this issue, he argued that success-
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evidence sufficient for a jury to conclude that plaintiff was terminated
because he campaigned against the defendant.
The court further rejected the defendant's contention that plaintiff
must prove "by clear and convincing weight of the evidence" that the
dismissal resulted because of his political associations. The court prop-
erly relied on Mt. Healthy to conclude that plaintiff was required to
prove illegal motivation only by a preponderance of the evidence. 62
Citing an earlier ruling by then Judge Stevens, 63 the court rejected de-
fendant's concern that government officials not be harassed by vexa-
tious lawsuits brought in the context of changes in administration.
Stevens had concluded that political considerations would not motivate
a large number of employment decisions, and to the extent that they
do, government efficiency is really lost rather than enhanced. In any
event, Stevens had noted that the value of individual liberties was well
worth the cost of any loss in efficiency.64
Thus in both of these decisions the Seventh Circuit properly allo-
cated the burdens of proof in order to give sufficient protection to the
important first amendment rights at stake while at the same time recog-
nizing the importance of government interests. It imposed on the
plaintiff the initial burden to establish by a preponderance of the evi-
ful candidates should not be assigned the ultimate burden of proving the propriety of "wholly
meritorious firings." Id at 1173. Instead he would adopt the Supreme Court analysis used in
Title VII employment discrimination cases wherein the ultimate burden of persuasion remains at
all times with the plaintiff, the defendant being required to bear only the intermediate burden of
producing evidence that the plaintiff was rejected for a legitimate non-discriminatory reason. See
Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
The majority properly rejected this analysis, refusing to draw a distinction between retalia-
tory discharge for engaging in protected speech or retaliatory discharge, as here, for engaging in
protected partisan political activities. Since Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976), made it clear that
such political firings are impermissible, there is no reason to afford added protection to successful
candidates who retaliate against those individuals who supported the opposing party. Note that
this same rationale was used by the majority to reject a qualified immunity defense on the part of
the defendant, i.e., since Elrod expressly forbade political firings following an election, the defend-
ant knew or should have known that her actions were constitutionally infirm and thus she was not
entitled to assert a qualified immunity defense. See supra note 5 1.
62. 653 F.2d at 1168 n.I.
63. Illinois State Employee's Union v. Louis, 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410
U.S. 928 (1973).
64. 653 F.2d at 1168 n.1, citing Illinois State Employee's Union v. Louis, 473 F.2d at 575.
Note that the court did overturn the district court's directed verdict on the issue of whether the
plaintiff was a policy maker and thus excepted from the prohibitions of Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S.
347 (1976). The Supreme Court in that decision found that the government's interest in effective-
ness and efficiency did justify patronage dismissals of individuals holding policy making positions.
Id at 367. In the subsequent decision of Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980), the Court framed
the question as "whether the hiring authority can demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropri-
ate requirement for the effective performance of the public office involved." Id at 518. The
Seventh Circuit found that the determination of the status as a policy maker presents a difficult
factual question which should have been submitted to the trier of fact. 653 F.2d at 1170.
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dence that the speech incident was a motivating factor. It then placed
upon the defendant the burden of showing that it would have reached
the same decision even absent the protected speech incident. Or, as the
Eggers v. Phillips65 decision suggests, the defendant can justify punish-
ment of an employee's speech by establishing that the speech was so
abrasive or disruptive as to warrant its curtailment.
III. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
There were several procedural due process cases decided this term
with most of them representing a direct application of the two-step
analysis required by Mathews v. Eldridge.66 Although none of the cases
dealt with the problem of identifying property or liberty interests, sev-
eral focused on the second step, i e., the adequacy of the process. One
of the more interesting cases concerns the interpretation and applica-
tion of the recent Supreme Court decision in Parratt v. Taylor.67 While
the decision does not provide a detailed analysis, Parratt seems to be a
key factor in the ruling in Ellis v. Hamilton.68 This issue will be dis-
cussed separately after a review of the other procedural due process
cases.
A. Application of Mathews: Adequacy of Process
The most extensive discussion of the adequacy of the process as-
pect of Mathews is found in Sutton v. City of Milwaukee.69 The ques-
tion in this case is whether "it is unconstitutional for the state or city to
tow an illegally parked car without first giving the owner notice and
opportunity to be heard, unless the illegally parked car is blocking traf-
fic or otherwise creating an emergency. 70 While the court recognized
that a car is property and cannot be taken by the state without due
process, it also noted that the property interest is a "slight one" because
the taking did not result in a permanent loss of the car, but rather the
loss of its use for a few hours.7' The starting point for analysis is obvi-
ously Mathews which "announced a simple cost-benefit test of general
applicability for deciding whether due process requires notice and
65. 669 F.2d 497 (7th Cir. 1982).
66. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). This requires first, an analysis of whether there was a protected
interest, either property or liberty, and second, if there is a protected interest, an analysis of what
procedural safeguards are due.
67. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
68. 669 F.2d 510 (7th Cir. 1982).
69. 672 F.2d 644 (7th Cir. 1982).
70. Id at 645.
71. Id at 646.
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hearing before government may deprive a person of property. ' 72 Ap-
plication of this cost-benefit test was described as follows:
[It] require[s] comparing the benefit of the procedural safeguard
sought, which is a function of the value of the property interest at
stake and the probability of erroneous deprivations if the safeguard
is not provided, with the cost of the safeguard. The benefit of the
safeguard can be thought of as the product of multiplying the value
of the property interest by the probability that the value will be de-
stroyed by a government error if the safeguard is not provided.
Quantification will rarely be possible but expressing mathematically
the relationship between the value of the interest and the probability
of its erroneous destruction may assist in thinking about the tests-
which, being general, are as applicable to the towing of automobiles
as to the termination or reduction of Social Security benefits. .... 73
Having determined that 1) the property interest is slight, 2) further
procedural safeguards would avert few errors in towing, and 3) the cost
of advance notice and hearings is prohibitive,74 the court concluded
that the benefits of towing illegally parked cars clearly outweigh the
very "modest cost" resulting from the lack of procedural safeguards.
Therefore, it is not a violation of the due process clause to tow an ille-
gally parked car without first giving notice and an opportunity to be
heard.75 Under these circumstances, post-towing procedures suffice.
Judge Posner's analysis of due process in economic terms is troub-
lesome. Even if Mathews requires a cost-benefit analysis, it is not so
clear that the Supreme Court anticipated a mathematical formula
based solely on the dollar value a court might attach to the competing
interests. Some interests, particularly liberty, cannot easily be assigned
a dollar value. Even with property interests, the same deprivation can
have different ramifications depending on people's circumstances. Is it
apparent that one's interest in the continuous use of an automobile is
always a slight one? Who pays the cost of towing? Assuming payment
of this cost is required before the automobile is returned, persons with-
out resources could go for an extended period without their car. What
are the benefits of towing improperly parked cars in non-emergency
situations? Why not start with a notice posted on the car giving the
owner a set period of time to move the car? A penalty or fine could still
72. Id at 645.
73. Id at 645-46.
74. Id at 646. The cost of advance notice and hearings was defined as "the cost of aban-
doning towing as a method of dealing with illegal parking," id, because it would simply not be
feasible to provide advance notice and hearings.
75. Id The court went on to find that towing illegally parked cars in non-emergency situa-
tions only if the owner has two or more unpaid tickets does not violate either due process or the
equal protection clause. Id at 648-49.
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be imposed even if it is moved within the prescribed time. Does imme-
diate towing really benefit anyone other than the towing companies?
The undefined benefits of towing are simply presumed to outweigh the
"modest costs" to the victims who own the automobiles. 76
In Illinois Physicians Union v. Miller77 a doctor in the union chal-
lenged the state's audit procedures utilized to determine whether physi-
cians had been overpaid through the medical assistance program.
Based on an audit of several sample claims-in the case of the named
plaintiff, 353 of 1302--the state would determine whether there was
overpayment and, if so, the total amount, through an extrapolation
process. The plaintiff doctor argued that this procedure violated due
process because it established a presumption of overpayment based on
statistics. This presumption, the doctor argued, shifted the burden to
the physician to demonstrate that the state's calculations were incor-
rect. Disagreeing with the doctor's characterization of the issue, the
court indicated that the burden is at all times on the physician to prove
entitlement to medical assistance payments and, therefore, the pre-
sumption does not have the effect of shifting any burden. Since the
burden is initially on the doctor, the court found the situation con-
trolled by Lavine v. Milne.78 This case challenged a New York statute
which presumed that an applicant for welfare, who voluntarily termi-
nated employment and applied for assistance within seventy-five days
of the termination, quit the job to become eligible for welfare or in-
creased benefits. This was not an improper presumption because prov-
ing the lack of an improper motive for terminating employment was
simply part of the applicant's burden of proving eligibility for welfare.
Next the court found that it was not unreasonable to require the
physician to rebut the state's evidence which was based on a statistical
sample and extrapolation. Because the physician had an opportunity
to rebut any allegations of overpayments, "the audit procedures are not
arbitrary, capricious or invidiously discriminatory. ' 79 Finally, apply-
ing the three factors from Mathews,8 0 the court concluded that the bal-
76. The court's suggestion, at 647, that Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972), may be super-
seded by Mathews is certainly without merit in light of the Supreme Court's recent reaffirmation
of Fuentes in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 102 S. Ct. 2744 (1982).
77. 675 F.2d 151 (7th Cir. 1982).
78. 424 U.S. 577 (1976).
79. 675 F.2d at 156.
80. "These factors are: (1) the private interest affected by the private action; (2) the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of that interest; and (3) the governmental interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that other procedures would entail." Id at
157, quoting Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
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ance "is heavily weighed in favor of the department." 81 Because of the
enormous number of claims and the resulting logistical problems of
medicaid enforcement, "statistical sampling is the only feasible method
available."8 2 The physician's opportunity and procedures for rebutting
the state's initial findings were found to be reasonable, particularly in
view of the fact that the evidence is uniquely in the control of the
doctors.
An issue not before the Court of Appeals but worth noting con-
cerns the district court's holding that due process was violated by the
department's failure to give physicians notice of the audit procedures
or their right to rebut the state's findings. The department was ordered
to promulgate and publicize regulations notifying physicians of the
sampling and extrapolation procedures and their right to rebut. These
regulations apparently were adopted and that part of the order was not
appealed.83
In several other cases, after finding a protected interest, the court
determined the process was adequate. In Dusanek v. Hannon,84 a ten-
ured school teacher, whose psychological condition was determined to
be unsatisfactory for him to continue teaching duties, was advised to
seek a leave of absence or it would be recommended that his services be
terminated in accordance with state procedures governing removal of
tenured teachers. After requesting and receiving two leaves of absence,
the teacher filed suit claiming the school board and its employees had
deprived him of a protected property interest without due process. In
essence he seemed to argue that he had been forced to take a leave by
the threat of statutory removal proceedings. The lower court denied an
injunction seeking reinstatement; however, the jury awarded him dam-
ages. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding no violation of due process
because the procedural protections available through the state statutory
scheme satisfy the requirements of the fourteenth amendment. 85 In
other words, the plaintiff could have refused to take a voluntary leave
of absence and thereby forced the defendants to utilize the statutory
process for removal.
81. 675 F.2d at 157.
82. Id
83. This is similar to a holding in Giacone v. Schweiker, 656 F.2d 1238, 1244 (7th Cir. 1981),
that the administrative law judge's failure to inform Social Security claimants of the existence and
importance of a "good cause" exception to the deadline for requesting reconsideration violates
procedural due process. The applicant there was 10 days late in filing for reconsideration; how-
ever, neither the administration nor the AiU informed him of the availability of a "good cause"
exception.
84. 677 F.2d 538 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 379 (1982).
85. Id at 542-43.
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In Lister v. Hoover,8 6 the procedural safeguards required by the
fourteenth amendment were met in an action by several University of
Wisconsin law students who were denied resident status. The court
found that the hearing held on the students' applications for reclassifi-
cation was adequate and the university officials did not have to inform
them more specifically of the standards utilized in determining the resi-
dence question because "the issue is one of intent and no catalogue of
objective criteria could, in most circumstances, be conclusive or deter-
minative. ' 87 The court did, however, remand the case for determina-
tion of whether the defendants had given adequate reasons for their
refusals to classify the plaintiffs as residents. The adequacy of reasons
given for a decision was also at issue in Solomon v. Elsea .88 After find-
ing that the federal parole statute89 creates a constitutional liberty in-
terest in release on parole, the court held that the reasons given for
denying the plaintiffs' parole were constitutionally sufficient. The stan-
dard, adopted from a Second Circuit decision, is whether the "state-
ment of reasons [is] sufficient to enable a reviewing body to determine
whether parole has been denied for an impermissible reason or for no
reason at all." 90 Provided the essential facts and the reasons are given,
detailed findings of fact are not required.
The importance of state procedures to the due process inquiry is
demonstrated by Poats v. Given. 91 An applicant for admission to the
Indiana Bar, who failed the examination four times, brought an action
challenging the alleged lack of procedures for review of the examina-
tion determinations. Because, under Indiana law, the applicant could
have sought review of each examination by the State Supreme Court,
procedural due process was satisfied. 92 The court also held that the
limit on the number of times an applicant could take the examination
was not arbitrary in that there is a rational connection between the re-
quirement and the applicant's fitness or capacity to practice law.93 A
final due process case was brought by non-tenured employees of the
Illinois Department of Corrections seeking damages from state officials
as a result of their discharge from employment. 94 When they were dis-
86. 655 F.2d 123 (7th Cir. 1981).
87. Id at 126.
88. 676 F.2d 282 (7th Cir. 1982).
89. 18 U.S.C. § 4206(a) (1976).
90. 676 F.2d at 286.
91. 651 F.2d 495 (7th Cir. 1981).
92. Id at 496-97.
93. Id at 497-99.
94. Colaizzi v. Walker, 655 F.2d 828 (7th Cir. 1981).
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charged, there was a public announcement that they had been guilty of
misconduct in office and they claimed their due process rights had been
violated because they had not been given an opportunity to answer the
charges against them. The lower court granted the defendants sum-
mary judgment on the grounds that they had established a qualified
good faith immunity as a matter of law. The Seventh Circuit reversed
finding that summary judgment was inappropriate because of the exist-
ence of factual disputes.
In order for the trial court to have entered judgement upon either
of the alternative defenses, undisputed facts must have established
(a) that plaintiffs had been afforded appropriate notice and an oppor-
tunity to be heard prior to the public announcement of the charges
against them, or (b) that the charges were in fact true. Since disputed
facts were present in both defenses, the case was not ripe for sum-
mary judgment.95
The lower court had confused the good faith test for qualified immu-
nity with the absolute defense of truth. With respect to immunity, the
question is "whether defendants, in good faith, had reason to believe
the procedures they followed satisfied the due process requirements of
[Roth ].,,96 As to the other defense, the question is simply whether the
charges were in fact true. The fact that the defendants may have be-
lieved the charges to be true is not sufficient to establish the latter de-
fense. Nor is this a sufficient basis to avoid the requirement of notice
and opportunity to be heard.97
Several of the decisions discussed above stress the importance of
available state or local procedures in determining whether the due pro-
cess clause has been violated. For example, in Sutton the post-towing
procedures agreed upon by the parties were prompt and found to be
sufficient; in Poats review of the examination scores could be obtained
in the Indiana Supreme Court; in Dusanek the teacher had available a
state statutory procedure which the defendants would have been forced
to utilize if he had simply refused to take a leave. Particularly where
only a post-taking procedure is required or feasible, the availability of
state procedures, 98 including judicial remedies, becomes a very signifi-
cant factor. This is discussed in the next section.
95. Id at 832.
96. Id at 831, citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 416 U.S. 232 (1972). Concerning the good
faith immunity, see infra notes 431-39 and accompanying text.
97. Id
98. The adequacy of the state procedures is, of course, subject to review in constitutional
terms. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 102 S. Ct. 1148, 1155-56 (1982).
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B. Application of Parratt: The Effect ofAvailable State Remedies on
Due Process Claims
Perhaps the most controversial due process decision rendered by
the Seventh Circuit was Ellis v. Hamilton .99 The case involved the cus-
todial rights of grandparents. The key plaintiffs were two sisters, one of
whom had given her son, Larry, up for adoption to the other. Larry
subsequently married and had four children. However, due to Larry
and his wife's negligence, the children for long periods of time lived
with the plaintiff sisters-their grandmother and great aunt. Eventu-
ally criminal charges were lodged as a result of the grandmother's com-
plaint against Larry and his wife for cruelty and neglect, and an order
was entered removing the children from their custody.' °° Larry told
the welfare defendants that he wanted two of the children to remain
with his natural mother and two with his adopted mother and he and
his wife then disappeared.
Although initially the defendants apparently acquiesced in the fa-
ther's proposal to place the children in the homes of the two plaintiffs, a
month later the defendant welfare officers ordered the plaintiffs, on two
days notice and without any explanation, to surrender the children to
them. The children were placed in foster homes and the defendants
refused to tell the plaintiffs the name or location of the foster parents.
The welfare officers then brought proceedings to terminate parental
rights, but made no effort to notify the plaintiffs of the proceedings.
Soon after an order was entered terminating parental rights, the plain-
tiffs sought to adopt the children. They were given a runaround by the
defendant court officers who offered specious objections to the formal
adequacy of the adoption petitions. After the plaintiffs filed three
adoption petitions, the defendants informed them that the children had
already been adopted by others.
Plaintiffs then filed suit against the welfare department in federal
court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 initially seeking nullification of the adop-
tions. However, after two years of litigation the plaintiffs decided it
would do more harm than good to uproot the children. They, there-
fore, amended their complaint to ask only for visitation rights and
damages for the deprivation of the custody of the children that they
would have enjoyed but for the actions of the defendants.' 0 '
The first issue in the case was whether the plaintiffs had any con-
99. 669 F.2d 510 (7th Cir. 1982).
100. Id. at 511.
101. Id at 512.
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stitutionally recognized liberty interest at all with regard to the chil-
dren. Although noting that a grandparent has no rights when the
children are in the custody of their parents, the court was reluctant to
conclude that the plaintiffs here did not have a liberty interest, espe-
cially in light of the fact that the plaintiffs were really in loco parentis to
the children when they were removed by the defendants. 0 2 It, there-
fore, assumed the existence of a liberty interest, but proceeded to hold
that defendants did not deprive plaintiffs of that interest without due
process of law.'0 3
The court admitted the underhanded conduct of the defendants
throughout the proceedings and more specifically the errors in Indiana
law that had been committed in processing plaintiffs' adoption peti-
tions.1°4 Nonetheless, the court held that plaintiffs had not established
a denial of due process of law. The court stated its rationale as follows:
"[d]ue process is denied in such a case only if the state fails to provide
adequate machinery for the correction of the inevitable errors that oc-
cur in legal proceedings . . " -105 Since the court found that Indiana
law provides a variety of remedies by which to correct the misbehavior
in question, it failed to find a due process violation. The court pointed
to several available state remedies, including habeas corpus when the
welfare officers removed the children from plaintiffs' homes; manda-
mus when the judge refused to allow them to file their own adoption
petition; an action based on fraud to enjoin the adoption away from the
plaintiffs; as well as a petition for visitation rights. 0 6 It argued that
plaintiffs did none of these things but instead went to federal court, and
by doing so made it "impossible" for the courts of Indiana to prevent
the defendants' alleged misconduct.
The court cautioned that it was not imposing an exhaustion-of-
102. Id. at 513. The court engaged in a rather lengthy discussion of this issue, noting that here
the natural grandmother voluntarily relinquished any prospective legal rights to the children when
she gave her son up for adoption. It also suggested that the rights of an adoptive grandparent may
not be the same as those of a natural grandparent. The distinct feature here, however, is that the
grandchildren were in the plaintiffs' custody, making the situation more analogous to that in
Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), wherein the Supreme Court protected the
rights of a custodial grandmother as against a restrictive zoning ordinance. See also Prince v.
Commonwealth of Mass., 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925);
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), all cases striking down state regulation which interfered
with "the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children
under their control." Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35 (1925).
103. 669 F.2d at 514.
104. Id
105. Id
106. Id at 5 14-15.
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state-remedies requirement on the plaintiffs. 0 7 This imposition would
clearly be contrary to well established law as recently reaffirmed by the
Supreme Court in Patsy v. Florida Board ofRegents.108 Instead it sim-
ply held that "there is no denial of due process if the state provides
reasonable remedies for preventing families from being arbitrarily bro-
ken up by local domestic relations officers such as the defendants in
this case.' °9 The court relied upon the Supreme Court decisions in
Parratt v. Taylor t10 and Ingraham v. White"' l to support its view that
the adequacy and availability of remedies under state law are relevant
in determining whether or not a deprivation of life, liberty or property
violates the due process clause. The court further stressed the fact that
the case involved family law, i e., a matter of local concern." 2 Finally
it noted the inappropriateness of federal courts handling custody cases,
especially where the decree sought would require continuous judicial
supervision and adjustment until the last child had grown up."13
Although the court's reluctance to become embroiled in custody
disputes is understandable, its analysis is disturbing. Until the
Supreme Court's decision in Parrait v. Taylor, it was well established
that the federal courts provided through § 1983 a supplementary
method of seeking relief for violation of constitutional rights.' "4 The
existence of state remedies was immaterial, the choice resting with the
plaintiff as to which tribunal to choose. The Supreme Court in Ingra-
ham v. White really did not alter this principle. There the Court, after
recognizing a liberty interest, applied the traditional Mathews ap-
107. Id at 515.
108. 102 S. Ct. 2557 (1982).
109. 669 F.2d at 515. In fact in this case remedies still existed under Indiana law. The plain-
tiffs had recently moved to intervene in a case pending against the adoptive parents of one of the
grandchildren who had been charged with child abuse and neglect. The court admits that these
developments also "bolster the plaintiffs"' contention that the defendants have mishandled the
whole business. Id at 515.
110. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
111. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
112. 669 F.2d at 515.
113. Id at 516. Note that this concern does not affect the plaintiffs' right to the damages they
seek for deprivation of their liberty interest.
114. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961), holding that the "federal remedy is supple-
mentary to the state remedy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the federal
one is invoked." The Supreme Court recently reiterated that § 1983 was intended to provide
immediate access to the federal courts "notwithstanding any provision of state law .. " Patsy v.
Board of Regents of State of Fla., 102 S. Ct. 2557, 2562 (1982). See also Wise v. Bravo, 666 F.2d
1328 (10th Cir. 1981), in which the concurring judge specifically noted that where a state official
interferes with the parent-child relationship in some egregious manner without procedural or sub-
stantive due process, § 1983 may be invoked, regardless of the existence of state remedies. Id. at
1338; O'Dell v. Espinoza, 633 P.2d 455 (Colo. 1981), dism'dfor want offuris., 102 S. Ct. 1865
(1982) (the existence of a state wrongful death action does not preclude a § 1983 claim).
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proach. 1 5 The issue raised was whether procedural due process re-
quired a hearing before a teacher could impose corporal punishment
on a student. In considering the nature of the right implicated and the
risk of erroneous deprivation, the Court noted the teacher's common
law right to use reasonable corporal punishment as well as the availa-
bility of state remedies to rectify abuse." 6 Its conclusion that a pre-
paddling hearing was not required was based in part on the existence of
state remedies that already provided some degree of protection to the
liberty interest in question. 1 7 However, the Court did not stray from
the traditional Mathews analysis used in deciding procedural due pro-
cess challenges and it never even reached any substantive due process
claims. 118
In this case the plaintiffs are not attacking the adequacy of Indi-
ana's adoption proceedings." 9 They are not saying that Indiana law
should require a pre-adoption hearing with participation on the part of
custodial grandparents. Rather plaintiffs are alleging that defendants'
conduct in their case deprived them of a protected liberty interest.
Thus Ingraham and Mathews are inapposite. The Court's subsequent
decision in Parratt is more analogous in that government conduct, as
opposed to established procedures, was challenged. However, the simi-
larity ends there. The case involved a suit by a prisoner seeking dam-
ages for the negligent loss of hobby materials he had ordered. The
materials were worth a nominal amount and there were no allegations
115. 430 U.S. at 675. See supra notes 69-82 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Mathews approach to procedural due process issues.
116. 430 U.S. at 675-77. The Court also stressed the minimal risk of error which did not
warrant intrusion into this area of primary educational responsibility. Id
117. Id at 682. Note that the dissent questioned whether Florida law provided meaningful
protection. The plaintiffs alleged that the theoretical right to sue after the fact was not good
enough because it was too late and illusory in that no such suit had ever succeeded. Id. at 693-94,
n.il.
118. The Court specifically refused to grant certiorari on the issue of whether corporal punish-
ment is so arbitrary and capricious so as to violate due process. 430 U.S. at 659 n.12. This
distinction was noted in Hall v. Tawney, 621 F.2d 607 (4th Cir. 1980), holding that the minor's
substantive due process claims based on the infliction of disciplinary corporal punishment were
cognizable under § 1983. In this case it is arguable that plaintiffs are entitled to damages for the
violation of their substantive liberty interests, in light of the egregious nature of the defendants'
conduct. Justice Blackmun, in his concurrence in Parratt, specified that ". . . there are certain
governmental actions that, even if undertaken with a full panoply of procedural protection, are, in
and of themselves, antithetical to fundamental notions of due process." 101 S. Ct. at 1918. Simi-
larly, Justice Powell noted that the due process clause imposes substantive limitations on state
action, permitting suit for intentional deprivations of liberty. Id at 1921-22. Both Justices com-
mented that Parratt should certainly not be read to alter this principle, which is unaffected by the
availability of state remedies.
119. 669 F.2d at 514. The court in fact conceded that if Indiana law placed them at the mercy
of county officials, that would raise a serious due process question. Instead they characterized this
as involving merely isolated errors of executive and judicial officials. Id
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of intentional deprivation of the plaintiff's property rights. 120 The
Court reasoned that only post deprivation procedures were required in
light of the impossibility of predicting in advance when a negligent
deprivation of property will occur.' 2' It also concluded that the state
tort remedies were sufficient to fully compensate plaintiff for his prop-
erty loss.122
Many subsequent decisions have read Parratt as being limited to
cases involving only negligent interference with loss of property, 23 re-
lying perhaps in part on the five concurring opinions in Parratt which
urged a more limited reading of the Court's holding. 24 Ellis was dif-
120. 451 U.S. at 536-37.
121. Id at 540.
122. Id at 544. In part Parratt rested on the notion that not every tort constitutes a violation
of the fourteenth amendment. The same principle was expressed in an earlier Supreme Court
decision: "Section 1983 imposes liability for violations of rights protected by the Constitution, not
for violations of duties of care arising out of tort law. Remedy for the latter type of injury must be
sought in state court under traditional tort-law principles." Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146
(1979).
Lower courts have relied on Parratt to hold that the misuse of legal procedure must be so
egregious as to subject the aggrieved individual to a deprivation of constitutional dimensions. See
Wise v. Bravo, 666 F.2d 1328, 1333-34 (10th Cir. 1981); Shillingford v. Holmes, 634 F.2d 263 (5th
Cir. 1981); Creative Environments, Inc. v. Estabrook, 680 F.2d 822 (1st Cir. 1982); Hull v. City of
Duncanville, 678 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1982). Here plaintiffs are claiming more than a violation of
common law tort or Indiana statute; they are arguing that the defendants deprived them of an
established liberty interest. See supra note 101.
123. See Duncan v. Poythress, 657 F.2d 691 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. dirm'd, 103 S. Ct. 368 (1982),
in which the court rejected the argument that Parratt precluded a § 1983 claim for violation of
voting rights because the state provided an adequate remedy through mandamus; Howse v. De-
Berry Correctional Institute, 31 CRIM. L. REP. 2210 (M.D. Tenn. 1982), discussed infra notes 126-
28 and accompanying text; Romeo v. Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147 (3d Cir. 1980), aff'd 102 S. Ct. 2452
(1982), where the court specifically noted that the availability of a state law remedy is irrelevant in
a § 1983 suit seeking damages for improper care; Tarkowski v. Hoogasian, 532 F. Supp. 791
(1982), finding that a state agent's intentional deprivation of plaintiff's property was actionable
under § 1983 despite the availability of a state tort remedy; Parker v. Rockefeller, 521 F. Supp.
1013 (N.D. W.Va. 1981), holding that Parratt does not preclude claims based on intentional depri-
vation of property, and that Parratt did not alter the distinction previously recognized by the
Seventh Circuit between intentional and negligent acts, citing Kimbrough v. O'Neil, 545 F.2d
1059 (7th Cir. 1976); Wakinekona v. Olem, 664 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1981), holding Parratt inappli-
cable on the basis of Blackmun's concurrence confining the opinion to deprivations of property
and not liberty interests.
Professor Tribe has suggested that in light of the four or five separate opinions in the Parratt
case, the only common denominator that can be extracted is that intent is not invariably required
to make out a § 1983 cause of action, but that when only a property interest is involved, and it is
the type of claim that could be redressed by subsequent relief in the state courts, some systematic
defect must exist in the scheme of subsequent relief. 3 SUPREME COURT: TRENDS & DEVELOP-
MENTS 1980-81, at 289. Tribe's analysis is reflected in the Supreme Court's most recent decision,
Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 102 S. Ct. 1148 (1982). The Court found that the state-created
employment discrimination claim was a "property interest" which triggered the fourteenth
amendment guarantee of a meaningful hearing, which the state failed to provide. In a sense the
Court in Parratt suggested that the prisoner only had a "property interest" in a cause of action for
negligent property loss, which the state satisfied through its tort claims statute.
124. 451 U.S. at 545-66. Justice Blackmun in fact specified that the Court's opinion should not
be read as applicable to a case concerning deprivation of liberty, citing Moore v. City of East
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ferent in two respects. First, the allegations were intentional acts on the
part of the welfare officials to deprive the plaintiffs of their protected
constitutional rights. Where intentional, as opposed to merely negli-
gent acts are perpetrated, the importance of § 1983 as a deterrent of
wrongful conduct comes into play.' 25 Second, the interests involved
here were not simply property but rather very significant, well-estab-
lished liberty interests involving the right of custody to these grandchil-
dren. Plaintiffs alleged that the defendants unreasonably deprived
them of the society of the children and later stymied their efforts to
obtain custody by adoption.
Other courts have stressed these distinguishing factors. For exam-
ple, in Howse v. DeBerry Correctional Institute 26 the court refused to
extend Parratt to a case involving intentional deprivation of a pris-
oner's liberty interest. The court stated that the Supreme Court in Par-
ratt did not intend that all § 1983 constitutional claims be rejected
simply because a state may provide a similar remedy. 27 It noted that a
state employee's intentional deprivation of another's clearly protected
liberty interest is the prime target of § 1983. Furthermore, it cautioned
that the extension of Parratt to all cases in which the state provides a
parallel remedy would render § 1983 meaningless in many instances.' 28
Unfortunately, many courts of appeals have applied the Parratt analy-
sis without distinguishing between intentional or negligent official mis-
conduct, although almost all of the cases have involved deprivation of
property-not liberty interests as were implicated in Ellis. 129
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), as authority. Id at 545. The latter decision involved the custodial
rights of a grandmother, and thus clearly indicates the inappropriateness of applying Parrat to
the fact situation facing the Seventh Circuit. Note that in the earlier Ingraham decision the dis-
sent went on record as opposing a Parratt approach to intentional deprivations of liberty, 430 U.S.
at 700 (White, J., Brennan, J., Marshall, J., and Stevens, J., dissenting).
125. Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 590-91 (1978) ("[tjhe policies underlying § 1983
include compensation of persons injured. . . and prevention of abuses of power by those acting
under color of state law.") See also Kupter, Restructuring the Monroe Doctrine.- Current Litigation
Under Section 1983, 9 HASTINGS CON. L.Q. 463, 471 (1982). Further, in Parrait Justice Marshall
in dissent, as well as Justices Blackmun and White in their concurrences, specifically stated that
they would not extend the case to intentional takings of property.
126. 31 CRIM. L. REP. 2210 (M.D. Tenn. 1982).
127. Id Professor Tribe has noted that the Supreme Court has never denied relief in the fed-
eral courts when a federal constitutional right is jeopardized. Rather it has stated that in certain
circumstances there is no federal substantive right infringed upon because the right in question is
only a right to a constitutionally adequate system of state law. When you have that-when the
state provides enough preventive and remedial relief-you do not have a federal claim on the
merits. 3 SUPREME COURT: TRENDS & DEVELOPMENTS 1980-1981 at 240.
128. 31 CRIM. L. REP. 2212. Note, however, that the court does dismiss the case, deciding that
the injury (a physical assault) does not amount to a deprivation of constitutional rights. Id at
2212.
129. Flower Cab Co. v. Petite, 685 F.2d 192 (7th Cir. 1982) (denial of cab license was ade-
quately protected by post-deprivation state law remedies); Engbloom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957 (2d
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In Ellis the Seventh Circuit cited as authority an earlier Sixth Cir-
cuit decision in which a grandmother and uncle were seeking custody
via habeas corpus. 30 That case is clearly distinguishable, because the
habeas corpus statute specifically requires exhaustion of state reme-
dies.' 3' Furthermore, the Supreme Court this term specifically re-
nounced the use of habeas corpus as a means of relitigating child
custody disputes. 132 Here the plaintiffs relied not upon the habeas
corpus provision but on § 1983 which has traditionally been used as a
means of vindicating deprivations of civil rights. The court's broad
reading of the Parratt decision is unwarranted in light of the circum-
stances of this particular decision, where intentional deprivation of
substantive liberty interests was pleaded. 33 Although the court per-
haps correctly concluded that part of the relief sought, i e., visitation
rights, could not be properly administered by the federal court, its
holding that due process was not violated because of the existence of
state remedies sets a dangerous precedent.
IV. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION
The Seventh Circuit handed down several decisions dealing with
employment discrimination. Most arose in the context of interpreting
Cir. 1982) (although striking officers had a property interest in their living quarters, state law post-
deprivation procedures provided sufficient protection of the due process rights); Pedersen v. South
Williamsport Area School Dist., 677 F.2d 312 (3d Cir. 1982) (availability of post-termination
hearing under state law satisfied the due process rights of a discharged school employee); Loftin v.
Thomas, 681 F.2d 364 (5th Cir. 1982) (adequate state remedy protected due process rights of a
prisoner claiming negligent loss of his clothing by the sheriff); Tymiak v. Omodt, 676 F.2d 306
(8th Cir. 1982) (state court proceedings sufficiently protected plaintiff's property interest in his
home); Sheppard v. Moore, 514 F. Supp. 1372 (M.D.N.C. 1981) (state common law action in
conversion adequately protected plaintiffs property interest); Keystone Cable-vision Corp. v.
FCC, 464 F. Supp. 740 (W.D. Pa. 1979) (city's revocation of electrical permit does not violate due
process in light of the post-revocation hearings provided by the state).
On the other hand, at least one other circuit has already extended Parratt in cases implicating
liberty concerns. In Rutledge v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1981), the court
applied Parratt to a suit by an athlete alleging assault and battery, harassment, etc. by the athletic
director and coaches. The court concluded that the post-deprivation hearing provided under state
law satisfied the due process requirement even though liberty concerns were at stake. Id at 1352.
Although the court may have concluded that the defendant's conduct was not sufficiently egre-
gious to state a constitutional claim (see supra note 122), its reliance on Parrat to justify relegating
plaintiff to state tort remedies is clearly erroneous.
130. Ellis v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510, 515 (1982), citing Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d 625
(6th Cir. 1978).
131. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1976).
132. Lehman v. Lycoming County Children's Serv. Agency, 102 S. Ct. 3231 (1982).
133. Note that this was the conclusion reached by the Third Circuit in a case involving liberty
interests: ". . . understandable concerns with stemming the federalization of common law tort
actions must not overcome a court's duty to safeguard legitimate constitutional rights." Romeo v.
Youngberg, 644 F.2d 147, 157 (3d Cir. 1980), aft'd, 102 S. Ct. 2452 (1982).
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,134 which bars discrimination
on the basis of race, sex, religion and national origin. Difficult issues
were raised as to the proper allocation and quantum of proof as well as
appropriate defenses.135 In addition, the court dealt with the constitu-
tionality of the 1974 amendment to the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act, which extended the proscriptions of the Act to cover state
and local governments. 136 Finally, in a case clearly implicating em-
ployment opportunities, the Seventh Circuit upheld the power of the
federal government to deny commercial radio operator licenses to
aliens. ' 37
A. Title VIP Establishing a Prima Facie Case
1. Retaliatory Discharge
Before dealing with the more traditional Title VII cases, two deci-
sions should be noted which interpreted a provision of Title VII bar-
ring retaliatory discharges. Section 704(a) of Title VII provides: "It
shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discrimi-
nate against any of his employees ...because he has opposed any
practice made an unlawful employment practice by this title. . . 138
In two decisions, the appellate court overturned the lower courts' nar-
row interpretations of this clause.
First, in the case of EEOC v. St. Anne's Hospital of Chicago,
Inc. ,'139 the Seventh Circuit rejected the defendant's contention that the
"opposition clause" of § 704(a) applies solely to an individual who op-
poses a practice of the employer which constitutes unlawful discrimina-
tion against minorities. The white plaintiff had hired a black employee
and, allegedly as a result of her action, she lost her job. Since the hos-
pital employer took no adverse action against the black employee, i.e.,
a member of a minority group, it urged dismissal of the suit. The Sev-
enth Circuit disagreed and instead adopted a broader interpretation
which would protect an employee who hires a minority applicant and is
subsequently discharged. 140 Despite the literal reading of § 704, the
court concluded that it would impede compliance with Title VII if em-
ployees in decision-making positions who hired minority applicants
134. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e(15) (1976).
135. See infra, notes 139-222 and accompanying text.
136. See infra, notes 223-38 and accompanying text.
137. See infra, notes 239-51 and accompanying text.
138. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1976).
139. 664 F.2d 128 (7th Cir. 1981).
140. Id at 132.
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had to fear losing their own jobs because of the racial bias of others. 14'
Since § 704(a) was specifically designed to encourage employees to pro-
tect Title VII rights, the court concluded that the provision was broad
enough to protect the plaintiff in this case.
The Seventh Circuit reached the same conclusion in Rucker v.
Higher Educational Aids Board, 42 where plaintiff contended that he
was fired because he opposed the efforts of his superiors to discriminate
on racial and sexual grounds against a white woman whom he hired.
The plaintiff alleged that his superiors instructed him to write a memo-
randum stating that the local black community did not want a white
employee to serve as a counselor, and later instructed him to give the
white employee a poor evaluation so that she would not receive perma-
nent status at the end of her probationary period of employment. He
contended that his refusal to cooperate with the proposed discrimina-
tion resulted in his suspension. 43 The district court concluded that the
white woman had not been the victim of race discrimination and it
dismissed plaintiffs claim.44
The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding initially that the white em-
ployee probably had been a victim of sex discrimination, 45 but con-
cluding that, in any event, it is a violation of Title VII to fire an
employee because he opposed discrimination against a fellow em-
ployee, even if he was mistaken and there was no discrimination. 46
The court relied on earlier precedent 147 protecting an employee who is
acting in good faith and reasonably believes there has been discrimina-
tion against a fellow worker. 48 The court concluded that a violation of
Title VII is committed "when an employee opposes an attempt to dis-
criminate against an employee so successfully that the employer desists
from the attempt and then fires the 'whistleblower' for what he has
done." 49
Thus in both decisions the court correctly interpreted the retalia-
tory discharge provision as broad enough to protect non-minority em-
ployees who are trying to promote the goals of Title VII and are
punished for their efforts. Although perhaps a literal reading of the
141. Id at 132-33.
142. 669 F.2d 1179 (7th Cir. 1982).
143. Id at 1180.
144. See 669 F.2d at 1182, discussing the district court opinion.
145. See discussion infra notes 183-186 and accompanying text.
146. 669 F.2d at 1182.
147. Id, citing Berg v. LaCrosse Cooler Co., 612 F.2d 1041 (7th Cir. 1980).
148. Id citing Berg at 1045. See also Parker v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 652 F.2d 1012 (D.C. Cir.
1981).
149. 669 F.2d at 1182.
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section might limit its protection to employees opposing actual Title
VII violations committed by their employers, this approach would
leave an employer free to frustrate the goals of the Act by firing any
employee who hires minority applicants or who seeks to protect their
interests.
2. Disproportionate Impact and Disparate Treatment
In several decisions the Seventh Circuit had to determine whether
plaintiffs had established a prima facie case of employment discrimina-
tion. The Supreme Court has recognized two different vehicles for sat-
isfying this prima facie case requirement. First, plaintiff may allege
that a facially neutral policy has a disproportionate impact on the mi-
nority group. 50 This is generally established through the use of statis-
tical data.151 In the alternative, plaintiff can satisfy the prima facie case
in a so-called disparate treatment situation by showing that he is a
member of a minority, that he applied for the position and was quali-
fied for the job, and that the job remained open or was filled by a non-
minority. 152 As to the disproportionate impact situation, the burden
then shifts to the defendant to establish that the policy is at least job
related. 153 In the disparate treatment cases, the Supreme Court has
held that the burden which shifts to the defendant is simply a burden of
production, iLe., he must come forth with some legitimate nondiscrimi-
natory reason for his treatment of the plaintiff.154
The Seventh Circuit basically followed the Supreme Court rulings,
150. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971). Proof of discriminatory intent on
the part of the employer is irrelevant in disproportionate impact cases. Id. at 432.
151. See Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), wherein the Court discusses the
basic mode of analysis for evaluating statistics used to prove the existence of discriminatory prac-
tices. See also Note, Employment Discrimination: Statistics and Preferences Under Title VII, 59
VA. L. REV. 463, 465-70 (1973).
152. McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798-800 (1973). Under the disparate
treatment theory, plaintiff must show that the employer's actions were motivated by discrimina-
tion. Id at 805-06. However, the Supreme Court in McDonnell-Douglas held that plaintiff ini-
tially satisfied that burden by making the enumerated allegations. See B. SCHLEI AND P.
GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1155 (1976).
153. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 431 (1971). Note that there is some disagreement as to whether the employer should have to
satisfy the stricter standard of business necessity. The lower courts are divided on the question
and the Supreme Court has not yet resolved the conflict. See Comment, The Business Necessity
Defense to Disparate Impact Liability under Title VII, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 911 (1976); Fisher, The
Business Necessity Defense in the Ninth Circuit, 12 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 68 (1982) (noting the
division within the Ninth Circuit). It is also unclear whether the burden which shifts to the de-
fendant is merely a burden of production, as in disparate treatment cases, or a burden of persua-
sion. See, e.g., Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 657 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
293 (1982).
154. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 (1981).
429
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but its analysis was rather unclear and perhaps erroneous in one deci-
sion. In the case of Garcia v. Rush-Presbyterian,155 the employment dis-
crimination allegations were based on both disproportionate impact as
well as disparate treatment of Latinos. The court initially concluded
that the plaintiff failed to make an adequate showing of either statisti-
cal or direct evidence to satisfy the disproportionate impact require-
ment. 56 It noted that the trial judge had carefully analyzed the
statistical information submitted to him and had made subsidiary find-
ings to support his decision.' 57
The court went on to deal with plaintiffs claim that he had been
adversely treated because he was Latino. The plaintiff argued that he
was a member of a minority group, that he applied for the position of
maintenance mechanic, that he was qualified for the job, and that a
white man was hired instead. 58 On its face this should satisfy the re-
quirements imposed pursuant to the Supreme Court decision in Mc-
Donnell-Douglas. 59 The court, however, erroneously cited a later
decision, Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,160 to sup-
port its holding that these allegations were insufficient "unless the cir-
cumstances give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination."' 16'
Although the Supreme Court in Burdine did state that plaintiff must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she was rejected
"under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful dis-
crimination," it specifically noted that this inference is established at
the prima facie case stage of the litigation by satisfaction of the four-
prong McDonnell-Douglas standard. 62 In fact, the Supreme Court
155. 660 F.2d 1217 (7th Cir. 1981).
156. Id. at 1221-25.
157. Id The plaintiffs had argued that the requirement that an employee speak and read Eng-
lish had a disparate adverse impact on Latinos, but the statistical data simply failed to indicate
that the impact was any greater on Latinos than on any other group. Also the court noted that the
ability to speak and read some English was a necessary, job related requirement for virtually every
job in the highly sophisticated medical care institution run by defendants. The evidence indicated
that there was no statistically significant under-employment of Latinos at the defendant's
institution.
158. Id at 1226.
159. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
160. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
161. 660 F.2d at 1226.
162. 450 U.S. at 253. Note that the relatively lax rebuttal burden imposed on the defendant,
iLe., simply producing some evidence of a legitimate non-discriminatory reason for the conduct,
was perhaps intended to neutralize the plaintiffs easy burden to show a prima facie case. It is
really at the third stage in the litigation that the analysis becomes critical. Plaintiff is required to
prove that the defendant's justifications are pretextual. McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. at 804 (1973); Davis v. Weidner, 596 F.2d 726, 729 (7th Cir. 1979). The problem with the
analysis in Garcia is that the court has imposed a heavy burden on the plaintiffs at the initial stage
of litigation, contrary to the remedial purposes of Title VII. See Friedman, The Burger Court and
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specified that the prima facie case it refers to does not describe the
plaintiffs ultimate burden of producing enough evidence to permit the
trier of fact to infer the fact at issue. 163 Instead the term is used to
denote the establishment of a legally mandatory, rebuttable presump-
tion.164 This explanation buttresses the conclusion that the Supreme
Court in Burdine did not intend to in any way alter the analysis it had
earlier approved in the McDonnell-Douglas decision. The focus in Bur-
dine was on defendant's rebuttal burden only. Perhaps, in light of all
the evidence presented during the trial, plaintiff indeed failed to carry
his ultimate burden of persuasion. 65 The court's statements regarding
prima facie case are nonetheless misleading.
In another case, Clark v. Chrysler Corp. ,166 the Seventh Circuit ad-
hered to the four-prong McDonnell-Douglas standard, although it con-
cluded that plaintiff failed to meet two of the requirements, i:e., that
plaintiff was qualified for the position she sought or that the position
remained opened and the employer continued to seek applications
from persons of her qualifications. 67 The court noted that a plaintiff
fails to establish a prima facie case by failing to "demonstrate qualifica-
tions or experience for an unskilled position when such qualifications
of experience are consistently sought by the employer."'' 68 Thus, it re-
jected her disparate treatment claim of race discrimination.
The court found that none of the practices of the employer had a
disproportionate impact on blacks. 169 It applied both the statistical
analysis suggested by the Supreme Court in Albermarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 170 comparing the percentage of blacks in the total hirees to the
percentage of blacks in the total applicants, as well as the model set
forth in the Hazelwood School District v. United States,17 1 comparing
the percentage of black hirees in the total hirees to the percentage of
the Prima Facie Case in Employment Discrimination Litigation- A Critique, 65 CORNELL L. REv. 1,
4 n. 17 (1979); Comment,-4pplying the Title VII Prima Facie Case to Title VII Litigation, 11 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 128, 167-77 (1976).
163. 450 U.S. 254 n.7.
164. Id The Court in McDonnell-Douglas inferred, upon proof of these four factors and the
absence of any explanation by the defendant, that a rejection of the plaintiff-applicant was based
on a consideration proscribed by Title VII. This scheme was reaffirmed by the Court in Board of
Trustees v. Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978); Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577
(1978). The Seventh Circuit recently acknowledged this same principle. DeLesstine v. Fort
Wayne State Hosp., etc., 682 F.2d 130, 132 n.3 (7th Cir. 1982).
165. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253.
166. 673 F.2d 921 (7th Cir. 1982).
167. Id at 929-30.
168. Id at 930 citing Holder v. Old Ben Coal Co., 618 F.2d 1198 (7th Cir. 1980).
169. Id at 929.
170. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
171. 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
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blacks available in the relevant labor market. After an extended dis-
cussion of the statistical data pursuant to these two models, the court
concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to meet the burden of proving
discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence.172 The statistical
data simply failed to demonstrate a significant or substantial
disparity. 173
B. Title VII: Defenses to Claims of Discrimination
1. Legitimate Business Purpose
The Seventh Circuit also dealt with several decisions concerning
appropriate defenses to Title VII employment discrimination claims.
In the case of Boyd v. Madison County Mutual Insurance Co. ,174 the
plaintiff, who was one of four management personnel, alleged that he
was discriminated against when his company adopted an attendance
bonus policy which applied only to clerical employees. He established
that all clerical employees were female whereas all the supervisory po-
sitions as well as the adjustors for the company were men. 75 The dis-
trict court had dismissed plaintiff's complaint based on its belief that
differentiation with regard to wages was only actionable if the discrimi-
nation violated the terms of the Equal Pay Act.' 76 Under this analysis
the prohibition in Title VII against sex-based discrimination in com-
pensation would be limited, as is the Equal Pay Act, to situations in
which the employees were performing the same or substantially the
same work. The Supreme Court in the recent case of County of Wash-
ington, Oregon v. Gunther 177 explicitly rejected this interpretation, con-
cluding that plaintiffs can state claims of sex based discrimination in
compensation under Title VII without proving they are performing a
job substantially equal to that held by a higher paid member of the
opposite sex. 178 Based on the intervening Gunther decision the Seventh
Circuit proceeded to apply classic Title VII analysis, and found that
plaintiff had indeed established a prima facie case of sex
discrimination. 179
Continuing its analysis, the court held, however, that the defend-
ant satisfied the rebuttal burden established by the Supreme Court in
172. 673 F.2d at 929.
173. Id See also supra note 151 on the issue of statistical data.
174. 653 F.2d 1173 (7th Cir. 1981).
175. Id at 1175.
176. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (1976).
177. 452 U.S. 161 (1981).
178. Id at 181.
179. 653 F.2d at 1177-78.
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Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, i e., the burden to
produce evidence of a legitimate non-discriminatory basis for its con-
duct.180 Here the evidence showed that the policy was implemented in
response to a serious absenteeism problem with the clerical staff. Al-
though the defendant obviously practiced discrimination in maintain-
ing an all-female clerical staff, the Seventh Circuit held that this was
not rebuttal evidence for the plaintiff.18' Rather he had to introduce
evidence tending to show other discriminatory treatment by the de-
fendant towards himself or other male employees or a general pattern
of discrimination against male employees in order to establish that the
legitimate non-discriminatory purpose stated by the defendant was
pretextual.' 82 Since plaintiff presented no evidence to rebut defend-
ant's proof of a legitimate business purpose, judgment. had to be ren-
dered for the defendant.
2. Customer Preference and Threats
Two Seventh Circuit decisions involved less typical employer de-
fenses to discrimination. First, in the case of Rucker v. Higher Educa-
tional Aids Board, 83 a black man brought an employment
discrimination action contending that the Board fired him because he
opposed efforts of his superiors to discriminate on racial and sexual
grounds against a white woman who worked for the Board. The dis-
trict court found that the white woman was not a victim of discrimina-
tion because the Board was entitled to consider the preferences of its
clientele, which was largely black, for the counselor position. 84 Al-
though occasionally customer preference has been argued in sex dis-
crimination cases as constituting a bona fide occupational qualification
insulating a Title VII claim,1 85 the Act specifically excludes race and
180. 450 U.S. at 254-55 (1981).
181. 653 F.2d at 1178. Note that the Ninth Circuit recently addressed this problem of employ-
ees in segregated jobs who claim a discriminatory practice, the difficulty being that such employ-
ees are unable to point to others similarly situated who are not similarly treated. See Comment,
Eschewing the Fat Flight Attendant Weight Requirements and Title VII, 12 GOLDEN GATE L.
REV. 85 (1982).
182. 653 F.2d at 1178.
183. 669 F.2d 1179 (7th Cir. 1982). See earlier discussion of this case supra notes 142-49.
184. Id at 1181.
185. This customer preference argument is based on 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(I) (1976), which
permits employers to make employment decisions on the basis of "religion, sex, or national origin
in those certain instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualifi-
cation reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enter-
prise. ... Note that generally customer preference has been rejected as a justification for
discrimination. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., 653 F.2d 1273, 1276-77 (9th Cir. 1981), and
infra note 189 and accompanying text.
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color from this defense. The court noted that Title VII is a blanket
prohibition of racial discrimination, even more so than of other forms
of discrimination prohibited by Title VII. It concluded, therefore, that
it is "clearly forbidden by Title VII to refuse on racial grounds to hire
someone because your customers or clientele do not like his race."1 86 A
similar defense was raised in the case of EEOC v. St. Anne's Hospital of
Chicago '87 in which a white Jewish employee claimed she was dis-
charged because she hired a black man to fill a position in her depart-
ment. The defendant contended that the reason for discharge was not
the hiring decision, but that the hiring decision was followed the same
day by bomb threats from persons claiming membership in the Ameri-
can Nazi party. In addition to bomb threats, several unexplained fires
were started at the hospital. Since one of the threats specifically named
the plaintiff, the hospital administrator asked her to resign or be dis-
charged, asserting that she was an irritant to the person or persons
making the calls and/or setting the fires. 88
The Seventh Circuit analogized this argument to the "customer
preference cases," wherein the courts generally require that customer
preference be taken into account "only when it is based on the com-
pany's inability to perform the primary function or service it offers."' 189
The court similarly noted that unlawful threats of violence motivated
by racial hatred should not make lawful the discharge of an employee
for a hiring decision that was itself required by Title VII.190 Adapting
the customer preference argument to meet the present fact situation,
the Seventh Circuit concluded that the discharge would be permissible
only if the hospital could demonstrate "no alternative course of action
was available and that it could not continue to function safely with
[plaintiff] in its employ."' 91
The case presents an extremely difficult issue. In a sense the anal-
ogy to the customer preference cases is rather inappropriate. Those
cases hold that mere convenience of the business as reflected in cus-
tomer preferences is insufficient to override sex discrimination. 92
Here, on the other hand, the nature of the defense approached the con-
cept of business necessity. The employer was a hospital where scares
186. 669 F.2dat 1181.
187. 664 F.2d 128 (7th Cir. 1981).
188. Id at 130.
189. Id at 133, ciing Diaz v. Pan Am World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 950 (1970).
190. Id at 133.
191. Id
192. Diaz v. Pan Am World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d at 389.
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and unexplained fires are obviously more disastrous than in other situ-
ations. The dissent argued that while unqualified threats of violence
should not make lawful the discharge of an employee for valid hiring
decisions, it concluded that the particularized series of threats and actu-
al fires here should have been sufficient to justify the hospital's
actions. 193
The problem with the dissent's analysis is that even business ne-
cessity is not a defense to blatant race discrimination. 94 Illegal scare
tactics of a third party should not justify a practice expressly prohibited
by federal law. The majority did not really answer this concern. The
case reached the Seventh Circuit following a dismissal of the EEOC's
charges by the district court on jurisdictional grounds. 195 The Seventh
Circuit overturned the dismissal and remanded to determine whether
St. Anne's did all that it could as far as enlisting police protection and
investigating the threats, before it fired the plaintiff. 96 The remand
suggests that at some point St. Anne's might justify a dismissal. Even
under extreme circumstances, however, it is arguable that Title VII
prohibits termination, and that an employer could justify at best only a
temporary leave with pay until the problem can be rectified.
3. Informal Affirmative Action
Another difficult issue involving employer defenses to discrimina-
tion was raised in Lehman v. Yellow Freight System, Inc. ,197 in which a
white applicant sued an employer after a less qualified black applicant
was hired for a driving position. The employer contended the hiring
was a valid affirmative action decision. 198 The difficulty was due per-
193. 664 F.2d at 135 (Pell, dissenting).
194. Note that business necessity is a defense to a suit challenging an employment practice
which has a disproportionate impact on a minority group. See supra note 153. However, an
employer can rebut a disparate treatment claim only by showing a legitimate non-discriminatory
reason for his action. The discrimination of a third party should not qualify as a "non-discrimina-
tory" reason. Other circuits have held that the business necessity doctrine does not apply to overt,
intentional race discrimination. Knight v. Nassau County Civil Service Comm'n, 649 F.2d 157
(2d Cir. 1981); Miller v. Texas State Bd. of Barber Examiners, 615 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1980). The
only exception to this is where race is taken into account for the purpose of remedying past dis-
crimination. See infra notes 198-211 and accompanying text for a discussion of the validity of
such "affirmative action" programs.
195. 664 F.2d at 130. The district court held that the EEOC failed to satisfy the prerequisites
to suit because it had not sought conciliation regarding the charge of retaliatory discharge before
issuing its reasonable cause determination. The court rejected the argument, finding there is no
requirement that an invitation to conciliate be issued prior to the reasonable cause determination.
It concluded that the Commission satisfied all the necessary prerequisites to suit and that dismissal
on that basis was erroneous. Id at 131.
196. Id at 133-34.
197. 651 F.2d 520 (7th Cir. 1981).
198. Id at 522.
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haps in large part to the timing, i e., the case was litigated subsequent to
the Supreme Court's ruling in Regents of the University of Cal!fornia v.
Bakke 199 but prior to the Court's decision in United Steel Workers of
America v. Weber.2°° In the former case, the Supreme Court had ruled
that the fourteenth amendment prohibited the use of strict quotas in
affirmative action decisions. In the latter case, the Supreme Court up-
held the use of at least certain types of formally adopted voluntary af-
firmative action programs as against Title VII challenges. However,
the defendants had only the Bakke precedent and their defense reflects
the Court's analysis in that decision. The defendant testified that he
did not hire the black employee pursuant to any plan, but that he sim-
ply counted his race as a factor in the employee's favor.20' The same
emphasis on Bakke was seen in the plaintiff's proposed findings and
conclusions prior to trial, ite., the plaintiff argued that the defendant
was using a strict quota and the defendant strongly denied this.
Ironically, the evidence indicated that the national company, Yel-
low Freight System, did have a formal affirmative action program. The
immediate employer simply argued that he was not "terribly aware" of
the detailed plan for affirmative action and he was not acting pursuant
to such a plan. Thus, even if Yellow Freight had adopted a valid af-
firmative action plan pursuant to the Court's analysis in Weber, this
could not provide a defense because the defendant claimed he was not
acting pursuant to such a plan.20 2
Having rejected defendant's after-the-fact reliance upon any for-
mal program, the court proceeded to analyze the validity of his infor-
mal decision to give the black employee a plus factor based on his race
and to hire him. The court noted the dearth of authority as to the legal-
ity of informal affirmative action decisions under Title VII.203 The two
district court decisions that have dealt with the issue have reached dia-
metrically opposed conclusions, i e., one found that the Weber decision
should be extended to include informal individual acts favoring minor-
ities,2°4 while the other rejected the preferential employment decision
as not having been made pursuant to a "reasoned program. ' 20 5 The
199. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
200. 443 U.S. 193 (1979).
201. 651 F.2d at 522.
202. Id at 523-24.
203. Id at 525.
204. Meyers v. Ford Motor Co., 480 F. Supp. 894 (W.D. Mo. 1979). The court explicitly
rejected plaintifs argument that Weber was limited to formal affirmative action programs. It
interpreted it to allow employers to engage in unregulated race-related employment practices. Id
at 899 n.5.
205. Harmon v. San Diego County, 477 F. Supp. 1084 (S.D. Cal. 1979).
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Seventh Circuit refused to select a single approach to this issue, but
noted that Weber provided useful guidance as to the validity of infor-
mal affirmative action programs. The court cited the following as the
most significant aspects of the Weber decision:
1. The purpose of the affirmative action plan must be to break
down old patterns of segregation;
2. The plan must not unnecessarily infringe the rights of white
employees;
3. The plan must be a temporary measure not intended to maintain
racial balance but simply designed to eliminate racial imbalance
in the work force.206
Analyzed in light of these criteria the court concluded that the de-
fendant's ad hoc informal affirmative action decision was not insulated
from Title VII liability. 207 First, the defendant's testimony made it ob-
vious that the employer was not acting pursuant to a need to remedy
some past discrimination, i e., based on some type of statistical dispar-
ity between the local labor force and the minority composition of the
employer's work force. In fact, the defendant had testified that he had
no clear idea about the percentage of blacks in the local labor force.
The court, therefore, concluded that the employer hired the black em-
ployee without any idea as to the level minority hiring should reach.
Since he was unaware of any goal, his actions could unfairly discrimi-
nate against non-minority employees. 20 In addition, the plan failed to
set any type of a time limit. Thus, his informal decision to give minori-
ties a preference could have continued longer than needed. The court
stressed that it was not trying to set a general precedent as to the valid-
ity of informal affirmative action programs, noting that the unique rec-
ord in this case was due to its "interpositioning between ...Bakke
and. . Weber. ' '2°9 The court instead read Weber as generally seeking
"to strike a balance between the societal interest in affirmative action
and the right of individuals to be free from race discrimination." 210 It
concluded that here the activity of the defendant lacked sufficient "sub-
stantive and procedural safeguards to insure that all employees would
be treated fairly."'21'
206. 651 F.2d at 526, citing United Steelworkers of America v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 208
(1979).
207. Id at 527.
208. Id
209. Id at 528.
210. Id at 527.
211. Id at 528. One recent authority has criticized the Seventh Circuit's analysis in Lehman
as inconsistent with the affirmative action guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1608.3 (1979) which protect
affirmative action in circumstances going beyond Weber. The author argues that the distinction
between formal and informal affirmative action will often be illusory and that management
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4. Res Judicata as a Defense
In the case of Unger v. Consolidated Foods Corp. ,212 the plaintiff
alleged that she was a sales representative who lost her position because
of sex discrimination.2' 3 Pursuant to Title VII's mandate,2 14 the case
was initially heard via the state administrative route, i.e., a hearing ex-
aminer appointed by Illinois' Fair Employment Practice Commission
(FEPC) heard the charges and its conclusions were then reviewed by
the FEPC, which found against the plaintiff. The decision was reversed
in the Circuit Court of Cook County, but the Illinois Appellate Court
overturned the Circuit Court and reinstated the FEPC's findings in
favor of the employer. Plaintiff's petition for leave to appeal to the
Illinois Supreme Court was denied.
It was during the pendency of the Illinois proceedings that plaintiff
received her right to sue letter from the EEOC and filed the instant
action in federal court.2 1 5 At the time the case was decided the major-
ity of circuit courts had held that a plaintiff was not precluded, under
either principles of collateral estoppel or election of remedies, from re-
litigating a Title VII claim in a federal court subsequent to state admin-
istrative and judicial determinations. 21 6 The Seventh Circuit adopted
this position holding that plaintiff could turn to the federal court for
adjudication of her claims under Title VII. The court rejected the de-
should be given sufficient flexibility so as to promote the general goals of the Act. See Blumrosen,
Affirmative Action in Employment, 34 RUTGERS L. REV. 1, 25-29 (1981). The guidelines, which are
entitled to substantial deference, permit employers to adopt affirmative action plans based on an
analysis which reveals facts constituting actual or potential adverse impact, or based on a desire to
rectify the effects of prior discriminatory practices or to overcome the problems associated with a
limited labor pool resulting from historical restrictions against minorities. The record in this case,
however, fails to establish that the employer acted pursuant to any of these justifications. There-
fore, even applying the affirmative action guidelines, it is arguable that the action taken here was
in violation of Title VII. Note, in addition, that the employer did not argue he was acting in
conformity with the guidelines. If he had, he could have relied upon § 713(b) of Title VII which
protects such actions even if the employer does not receive an individualized opinion from the
Commission with regard to his affirmative action plan. Although an employer may use the guide-
lines to support the legality of its affirmative action program even if the plan is not in writing and
the employer was not aware of the guidelines, here even the guidelines probably would not save
the employer.
212. 657 F.2d 909 (7th Cir. 1981).
213. Plaintiff was replaced by a man and no women were interviewed for the position. Plain-
tiff was later rehired and appointed sales representative for another territory, but following her
filing of charges of discrimination, she was fired again. She thus alleged that the first termination
was based on sex discrimination and that the second termination was in retaliation for filing the
first charge. Id at 912.
214. Note that plaintiff filed a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC) concurrently with her state FEPC. In light of the state proceedings the EEOC de-
ferred action on the federal charges. See § 706(c) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c) (1976).
215. 657 F.2d at 912.
216. See cases cited 657 F.2d at 913-14.
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fendant's contention that since plaintiff decided to pursue state judicial
review, she should be bound by the principle of election of remedies
and precluded from relitigating the issues involved in the state proceed-
ings.217 The court found that foreclosure of Title VII's federal judicial
remedy "would serve to discourage plaintiffs from fully pursuing state
proceedings and would conflict with Title VII's statutory scheme which
encourages resolution of discrimination claims by state authorities
while reserving the right to proceed in federal court. '218
While the arguments appear persuasive, the Supreme Court this
term specifically rejected this analysis in Kremer v. Chemical Construc-
tion Corp. ,219 holding that the doctrine of preclusion, as embodied in 28
U.S.C. § 1738,220 bars a plaintiff who had pursued state judicial reme-
dies from relitigating the same issues in federal court. Since Title VII
contains no language exempting itself from the mandate of § 1738, the
Supreme Court reasoned that federal review was prohibited.22' The
Court further held that state proceedings only need to satisfy the mini-
mal procedural requirements of the due process clause in order to qual-
ify for the full faith and credit guaranteed by federal law. Since there
was no question raised as to propriety of the Illinois proceedings, the
Kremer rationale probably would result in the dismissal of the case.222
C. Age Discrimination in Employment Act." Application to
Government Employers
In another interesting case223 this term the Seventh Circuit consid-
ered the constitutionality of the 1974 amendment to the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act 224 (ADEA), which extended the Act's
proscriptions to state and local governments. The amendment has been
ruled unconstitutional in another case, which the Supreme Court will
review this term.225 Therefore, the analysis offered by the Seventh Cir-
cuit should be examined carefully. A preliminary issue is whether
217. Id at 914.
218. Id
219. 102 S. Ct. 1883 (1982).
220. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976), provides that "The. . .judicial proceedings of any court of any
such State . . .shall have the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States
and its Territories and Possessions as they have by law or usage in the courts of such State .
221. 102 S. Ct. at 1892-93.
222. Note that after this article went to press the Seventh Circuit did in fact reverse its earlier
decision, finding no reason not to apply Kremer retroactively. Unger v. Consol. Foods Corp., 693
F.2d 703 (7th Cir. 1982).
223. EEOC v. Elrod, 674 F.2d 601 (7th Cir. 1982).
224. 29 U.S.C. § 621-34 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
225. EEOC v. State of Wyo., 514 F. Supp. 595 (D. Wyo. 1981). Note the Supreme Court
reversed this ruling. 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983). See infra page 473-74.
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Congress acted pursuant to the fourteenth amendment or the com-
merce clause when it extended the prohibitions of ADEA to state and
local governments. If Congress was acting pursuant to the commerce
clause, a difficult tenth amendment state sovereignty issue is presented.
The Seventh Circuit found that ADEA was a constitutional exercise of
Congress' power under § 5 of the fourteenth amendment. 226 It went
on, however, to assert that even if Congress was acting pursuant to the
commerce clause, its exercise was valid and was not prohibited by the
tenth amendment. 227
As to the first finding, the court determined that the amendment
constituted "appropriate legislation" under § 5 of the fourteenth
amendment. Applying the prevailing standard, it found that the enact-
ment was "plainly adapted to the end of enforcing the equal protection
clause. ' 228 The court looked to the legislative history of the amend-
ment which stated as its purpose the prohibition of discriminatory gov-
ernment conduct. Such was viewed by the court as the very essence of
the guarantee of equal protection of the laws of the fourteenth amend-
ment. Furthermore, the court noted the analogy to Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 which was extended by a 1972 amendment to
similarly include state and local government. 229 Although the Title VII
amendments made explicit reference to the fourteenth amendment, the
court found that the substantive similiarity between the two acts both
in structure and chronology of development indicated that the source
of congressional authority was the same for both. 230 The court cited
the Supreme Court decision in Fullilove v. Klutznick,231 establishing
that the legislative history of an act need not make explicit reference to
the fourteenth amendment provided the objectives of an act are within
its scope.232 Since the goals of the 1974 amendment to ADEA were
clearly tied to the guarantees of the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment, the court concluded that Congress was acting pur-
226. 674 F.2d at 603.
227. Id at 611.
228. Id at 604.
229. The court noted that the extension of the ADEA to the states was originally proposed in
1972 at the same time the Title VII amendments were under consideration by Congress. Id at
607.
230. Id
231. 448 U.S. 448 (1980), cited at 674 F.2d 608.
232. 448 U.S. at 477-78. Note, however, the conflicting language on this issue in Pennhurst
State School and Hospital v. Haiderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) that "We should not quickly attribute
to Congress an unstated intent to act under its authority to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment."
Id at 16. The Court urged careful analysis of the legislative history--an analysis which might
still support the finding here that Congress intended to exercise its fourteenth amendment enforce-
ment power.
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suant to this provision.233
The Seventh Circuit proceeded to deal with the department's alle-
gation that the commerce clause was the basis for the extension and
that Congress' power to act pursuant to that clause is substantively lim-
ited by the tenth amendment as interpreted in National League of Cities
v. Usery.234 In that case the Supreme Court held that extension of the
Fair Labor Standards Act to cover state and local government employ-
ees violated states' rights in that it interfered with an attribute of state
sovereignty in an area in which the separate and independent existence
of the state was crucial. 235
The court noted that even assuming the commerce clause as the
source for extending ADEA, Usery could be distinguished on two
points: 1) it is questionable whether an interest in arbitrary discrimina-
tion on the basis of age is an attribute of state sovereignty; and 2) com-
pliance with ADEA unlike compliance with the FLSA would result in
minimal, if any, costs and thus would not threaten substantial restruc-
turing of government functions or services.236 The court noted that the
primary effect of ADEA would simply be to modify permissible criteria
in making employment choices, but it would not require the state to
assume a burden, financial or otherwise, which substantially interferes
with its sovereignty.2 37 The Seventh Circuit thus joins the majority of
federal courts which have considered the constitutionality of the 1974
amendment to ADEA and which have concluded that ADEA was con-
stitutionally applied to the states, regardless of whether Congress was
233. 674 F.2d at 609. The court notes that its analysis of the constitutional basis of Congress'
authority is in accord with the majority of courts that have confronted the issues. See cases cited
at 609 n.9. In addition to cases in the footnote, the same conclusion was reached in EEOC v.
Pennsylvania Liquor Control Bd., 503 F. Supp. 1051 (N.D. Penn. 1980) and Adams v. James, 526
F. Supp. 80 (N.D. Ala. 1981).
234. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
235. Id at 852. The significance of these factors was stressed in the subsequent Supreme
Court decision of Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Assoc., 452 U.S. 264, 287-88
(1981). In that case the Court identified three separate inquiries underlying the result in Usery:
I. The federal law must regulate the "States as States";
2. The law must address "attributes of state sovereignty";
3. The law must directly impair the state's ability to "structure integral operations in
areas of traditional governmental functions."
The Court's reluctance to find satisfaction of these three factors is reflected in the two most recent
decisions of the Supreme Court, namely United Transp. Union v. L.I. R. R. Co., 102 S. Ct. 1349
(1982) (upholding the application of the Railroad Labor Act to a state owned railroad) and Fed-
eral Energy Regulatory Comm'n v. Mississippi, 102 S. Ct. 2126 (1982) (upholding the validity of
the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 which required state utility regulatory commis-
sions to entertain various disputes under federal law as well as to "consider" certain federal pro-
posals with regard to energy conservation and to comply with federally dictated notice and
comment procedures in considering those proposals).
236. 674 F.2d at 611.
237. Id
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acting under the commerce clause or the fourteenth amendment.238
D. Discrimination Against Aliens
The Seventh Circuit also dealt with the employment opportunities
of another class. In Campos v. FCC2 39 permanent resident aliens chal-
lenged the constitutionality of § 303(1) of the Communications Act of
1934 which prohibits the Federal Communications Commission (FCC)
from granting a commercial radio operator license to aliens. 24° One of
the named plaintiffs was dismissed from his job as baggage handler for
an airline when he was unable to obtain a restricted radio telephone
operator permit deemed necessary for him in order to engage in radio
communications with landed aircraft during the unloading of passen-
gers and baggage. Two other named plaintiffs sought the operator per-
mit in order to pursue careers as a radio broadcaster and a broadcast
radio station engineer respectively. The plaintiffs, suing as a class, ar-
gued that the federal restriction deprived them of their right to equal
protection as guaranteed by the due process clause of the fifth
amendment. 24'
In dealing with the question of alienage, the Supreme Court has
adopted different standards depending upon whether the federal gov-
ernment or the state is doing the discrimination. The Court has held
that state discrimination against aliens is inherently suspect and there-
fore subject to strict judicial review, whether or not a fundamental right
is impaired. 242 Although the Supreme Court has recently applied a
more relaxed scrutiny to state classifications intended to protect certain
government functions,243 the strict scrutiny analysis continues to apply
where a state seeks to limit the private employment opportunities of
aliens, as in the case here. On the other hand, the Court has held that
federal regulation of aliens, where no substantive constitutional right is
238. Id at 612 n.15.
239. 650 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1981).
240. 47 U.S.C. § 303(1). The section gives the Commission authority to issue licenses to citi-
zens or nationals of the United States. Certain exceptions for the waiver of the citizenship re-
quirement are also stated in the provision. See 650 F.2d at 891 n.l.
241. 650 F.2d at 891. Note equal protection is required by the due process clause of the fifth
amendment as well as the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and that the same
level of judicial scrutiny is applied. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Boiling v. Sharpe,
347 U.S. 497 (1954).
242. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971).
243. See, e.g., Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 102 S. Ct. 735 (1982) (upholding the exclusion of
aliens as California peace officers); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1978) (upholding a citizen-
ship requirement for elementary and secondary school teachers); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291
(1978) (excluding aliens from the ranks of the state police force).
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impaired, must be upheld unless wholly irrational.244 It is argued that
the power of Congress to proscribe the terms and conditions on which
aliens may come into and stay in this country must be free from judi-
cial intervention. 2
4 5
Plaintiffs contended, nonetheless, that since the provision chal-
lenged here bars aliens from private rather than public employment,
the heightened scrutiny should be used. The Seventh Circuit flatly re-
jected this analysis, finding that deference is accorded federal regula-
tion of aliens both because immigration is an exclusively federal
interest and also because the federal power is of a political nature nec-
essarily subject to narrow judicial review. 246 Thus, it concluded that
"alienage-based classifications are not . . suspect in any category of
cases for Fifth Amendment purposes. '
247
Having rejected the analogy to state discrimination cases, the court
turned to a decision upholding a citizenship requirement for federal
civil service jobs. In Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 248 the Supreme
Court assumed without deciding that "the national interest in provid-
ing an incentive for aliens to become naturalized, or possibly even as
providing the President with an expendable token for treaty negotia-
tion purposes" was enough to justify the restriction. 249 The FCC ad-
vanced the same interests as justification for § 303(1), and the court
upheld the provision as not a "wholly irrational means" of serving fed-
eral interests. 250 In light of the analysis which the court used to support
the FCC regulation, it is highly unlikely that any federal statutory re-
striction on alien employment would be invalidated based on the irra-
tionality standard. Nonetheless, the outcome is not surprising in light
of the firm precedent of deferring to congressional determinations in
dealing with questions regarding alienage.25'
244. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976), upholding a federal statute denying Medicare
benefits to aliens.
245. Sing v. United States, 158 U.S. 538, 547 (1895).
246. 650 F.2d at 894.
247. Id
248. 426 U.S. 88 (1976).
249. Id. at 105. Note that the Supreme Court in this case found that although deference is due
the Congress or the President, since the provision here had been promulgated by the Chairman of
the Civil Service Commission, the Court invalidated the provision as violating the due process
clause, i.e., an improper delegation of authority.
250. 650 F.2d at 894.
251. See G. Rosberg, The Protection of .4liens from Discriminatory Treatment by the National
Government, 1977 SUP. CT. REV. 275 (1977).
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V. ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL RIGHTS
This section addresses issues which frequently arise in litigation
seeking to enforce civil rights. A plaintiff must have not only substan-
tive rights but also a basis for pursuing relief in federal court. This is
often provided by section 1983252 but it may also be implied in the
federal statute or constitutional provision relied upon for the substan-
tive rights. The availability of attorney fees to a prevailing plaintiff is
obviously a critical enforcement issue. Several other doctrines-immu-
nity, standing and state action--can effectively limit the availability of
relief for violations of substantive rights. All of these issues are dis-
cussed in the sections which follow.
A. Right of Action
Not surprisingly the court has again confronted the question
whether a right of action can be implied under a federal statute and, if
so, the type of relief intended.253 In addition, the court confronted the
related question of when section 1983 can be used to enforce federal
statutory rights. This issue, which seemed so simple and clear after
Maine v. Thiboutot,254-was substantially complicated and clouded by
subsequent decisions in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Haider-
man255 and Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea
Clammers Assn. 256
The Court, however, has recognized two exceptions to the applica-
tion of § 1983 to statutory violations. In (Pennhurst] we remanded
certain claims for a determination (i) whether Congress had fore-
closed private enforcement of that statute in the enactment itself, and
(ii) whether the statute at issue there was the kind that created en-
forceable "rights" under § 1983.257
The amount of time consumed litigating the preliminary question
whether a right of action and certain remedies should be implied under
federal statutes is incredible. 258 The Court has suggested that "[wihen
Congress intends private litigants to have a cause of action to support
252. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1980).
253. This issue continues to appear in decisions of the Supreme Court; during the 1981-82
term, it was addressed at some length in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 102 S.
Ct. 1825, 1837-44 (1982).
254. 448 U.S. 1 (1980) (§ 1983 can be used to enforce federal statutes, including the Social
Security Act).
255. 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (§ 1983 might not provide a cause of action in all situations where a
plaintiff attempts to enforce federal statutory rights).
256. 453 U.S. I (1981).
257. Id at 19.
258. Justice Powell, dissenting in Merrill Lynch, gives some indication of the amount of time.
"My research ... indicates that in the past decade there have been at least 243 reported circuit
444
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their statutory rights, the far better course is for it to specify as much
when it creates those rights. '259 It is easy to agree that it would be "far
better" if Congress expressly addressed remedies when it creates rights.
However, given the manner in which Congress operates, it is unrealistic
to expect such clarity in what is often controversial legislation. Getting
into the technicalities of enforcement in every piece of legislation con-
sidered by Congress could lead to endless debates.260 Justice Powell
suggests the courts could get out of this time consuming task by "dis-
continu[ing] the speculative creation of damages liability where the leg-
islative branch has chosen to remain silent."'26'
There is another way for the courts to deal with this. Why not
simply assume that Congress intends a remedy where it creates a right
and further assume that it intends the courts to exercise the full range
of their remedial powers unless expressly restricted by Congress? In-
stead of requiring Congress to address enforcement and remedy in each
piece of legislation, Congress would have to face these questions only
when it wants to change the general rule, i e., where there is a right
there is a remedy. This was suggested long ago in Bell v. Hood:
[W]hen federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been the
rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their reme-
dies so as to grant the necessary relief. And it is also well settled that
where legal rights have been invaded and the federal statute provides
for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use
any available remedy to make good the wrong done. 262
Whatever the merit of the presumption suggested above, it does
not represent the Court's view today,2 63 and therefore we must continue
to attempt to determine what Congress intended when it gives abso-
lutely no indication of its intent. The effort in Cort v. Ash264 to estab-
lish a definitive, workable scheme for analyzing this issue has turned
court opinions and 515 district court opinions dealing with the existence of implied causes of
action under various federal statutes." 102 S. Ct. at 1855 n.17.
259. Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717 (1979).
260. See, Wartelle and Louden, Private Enforcement of Federal Statutes: The Role of the Sec-
tion 1983 Remedy, 9 HASTINGS CON. L.Q. 487, 537 (1982); Steinberg, Implied Private Rights of
Action Under Federal Law, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 33, 41 (1979).
261. 102 S. Ct. at 1855 n.17.
262. 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946); See also, Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229, 239
(1969); Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916).
263. There is some suggestion in Merrill Lynch that, at least where courts have been implying
remedies under a statute prior to a substantial reconsideration of the statute by Congress, the
failure of Congress to expressly disapprove the remedies represents its intention to affirm their
availability. 102 S. Ct. at 1841-44. This is criticized by Justice Powell in dissent. Id at 1850-52.
The presumed knowledge of Congress of how the courts have interpreted an analagous statute has
also been used by the Court as evidence of congressional intent to provide a judicial remedy.
Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
264. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
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out to be a failure. However many factors the Court suggests, the ques-
tion really boils down to a matter of what Congress intended:
More recently, the Court has emphasized that the determinative
question in cases involving a claimed private right of action is
whether Congress intended to create the particular right of action
being asserted and has stated that the resolution of this question is
strictly a matter of statutory interpretation. The four Cori factors are
merely statutory interpretation aids. .... 265
Not only are the courts attempting to determine whether or not
Congress intended a private right of action; where the answer is yes,
they must then determine which remedies Congress might have in-
tended. This second level of inquiry is demonstrated by the decision in
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis266 where the Court,
after finding an implied right of action under the Investment Advisers
Act of 1940,267 concluded that the remedy is limited to equitable relief.
In Lieberman v. University of Chicago, the Seventh Circuit stated:
While the Supreme Court has made it clear that the issue of an im-
plied remedy is distinct from the issue of an implied cause of action,
guidance beyond that point is conflicting. It is agreed that the analy-
sis required is one of statutory construction, however, there is author-
ity that where a statute expressly provides a particular remedy it is
improper to imply the existence of other remedies, while on the other
hand the Court has stated that "the existence of a statutory right im-
plies the existence of all necessary and appropriate remedies. '268
Lieberman is a good example of this bifurcated inquiry. After the
Supreme Court held, in Cannon v. University of Chicago ,269 that there
was an implied private right of action under Title IX270 and the plain-
tiffs' claim for injunctive and declaratory relief had become moot, the
court faced the question of whether the plaintiffs could recover dam-
ages under Title IX. Relying on its conclusion that Title IX was passed
pursuant to the spending power of Congress, the court adopted the Pen-
nhurst guidelines "for construing implied rights and remedies in the
context of funding legislation," 27I and agreed with the lower court that
265. Barany v. Buller, 670 F.2d 726, 730 (7th Cir. 1982); the first two criteria under Cori are
whether the plaintiff is a member of the class for whose special benefit the statute was enacted and
whether there is any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, to create or deny a rem-
edy. See also, Merrill Lynch, 102 S. Ct. at 1838-39, where the Court recognizes that cases subse-
quent to Cori focus on the intent of Congress.
266. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
267. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-I to -21 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
268. 660 F.2d 1185, 1187 n.4 (7th Cir. 1981) (citations omitted).
269. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
270. Title IX is part of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1976).
271. 660 F.2d at 1187. The guidelines are found in the following quote from Pennhurst:
[Liegislation enacted pursuant to the Spending Power is much in the nature of a contract:
in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed conditions.
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damages could not be recovered for Title IX violations. Applying the
contract analysis of Pennhurst, the court indicated that absent express
congressional language establishing a damage remedy, the schools
could not possibly be agreeing to damage actions in accepting the fed-
eral funds which trigger the application of Title IX. Because the court
characterized Title IX as part of a bill designed to assist educational
institutions in "acute financial distress," it concluded that Congress did
not intend to subject such institutions to "potentially massive financial
liability" which might exceed the federal funds.272 In essence the court
is suggesting that Congress could not have intended to impose addi-
tional financial burdens on schools accepting the federal funds when
the purpose of the Act was to relieve some of the financial burdens.
In a persuasive dissent, Judge Swygert accepts the majority's con-
clusion that Title IX was passed pursuant to the spending power of
Congress. However, he argues that Pennhurst is not controlling be-
cause the issue there was whether the federal statute imposed any con-
ditions upon receipt of federal funding, i e., did the act involved in
Pennhurst provide the plaintiffs with any rights? 273 Because, in his
view, the analysis in Pennhurst is simply irrelevant to an inquiry of
whether a damage remedy should be implied and because the Supreme
Court in Cannon had already determined that an implied private cause
of action exists under Title IX, Judge Swygert relies on the principle of
Bell v. Hood274 to conclude that damages are available. He indicates
that the principle of Bell v. Hood serves two important purposes. First,
"it recognizes the unique role that federal courts play in enforcing fed-
eral rights," and second, "it gives courts guidance in analyzing matters
of remedies for violations of federal statutes. 275
As to the latter purpose, Judge Swygert expresses concern that the
majority opinion uses an analysis inapplicable to future cases in that it
The legitimacy of Congress' power to legislate under the Spending Power thus rests on
whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the "contract." 45 1
U.S. at 17 (citations omitted).
See, Note, Injunctive Relieffrom State Violations of Federal Funding Conditions, 82 COLUM. L.
REV. 1236 (1982).
The reach of the spending power is "at least as broad as the regulatory powers of Congress."
Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 475 (1980). One of the regulatory powers is provided by
section 5 of the fourteenth amendment which certainly gives Congress the power to prohibit sex
discrimination in education, even absent federal funds. If Congress could have achieved its objec-
tive under section 5, then Fullilove suggests the fact that Congress acted under the spending power
is not a limitation on the scope of the legislation. Id
272. 660 F.2d at 1188.
273. Id at 1189-90.
274. See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
275. 660 F.2d at 1192.
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does not provide a principled method for resolving such cases. He also
indicates that the four factor analysis recommended in Cort v. Ash
often provides very little guidance, particularly with respect to the im-
plication of a damage remedy. This is true because when Congress
does not expressly address the availability of judicial enforcement, it is
less likely that it would even hint at the remedy question than at the
implied right of action question.276 Judge Swygert does not have the
confidence of the majority in drawing the required fine distinctions in
analyzing the legislative history of Title IX and finds that this can be
avoided by applying the principle of Bell v. Hood:
Therefore, the principle of Bell v. Hood alleviates the tensions inher-
ent in this separation of powers problem. It correctly recognizes that
federal courts have the role of providing broad and flexible remedies
for violations of federal statutory and constitutional rights and
presumes that absent convincing legislative intent to the contrary the
power is plenary.277
While Judge Swygert would not necessarily presume a right of action
absent some express indication to the contrary, once an implied right of
action is found, he would presume that the full range of a federal
court's remedial power is available to the plaintiff.278
The availability of § 1983 to enforce federal statutory rights was at
issue in Anderson v. Thompson .279 The plaintiff filed this action pursu-
ant to the Education of All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA)280 to
seek judicial review of the decision of a state administrative agency.
On the merits, the lower court essentially ruled in favor of the plaintiff,
however, it denied her claim for damages and attorney fees. Clearly,
the EAHCA does not expressly provide for either attorney fees or dam-
ages. Therefore, the issues were whether a damage remedy should be
implied under the EAHCA and whether the EAHCA could be en-
forced through § 1983, thereby making fees available under § 1988.28
With respect to the former, Judge Swygert concluded that a dam-
age remedy was generally inconsistent with and not intended under the
EAHCA except in a couple of circumstances where a limited damage
276. Id at 1193.
277. Id
278. Lieberman is significant because it is the first Court of Appeals decision relating to the
implication of a damage remedy under Title IX. As noted in the opinion, the second circuit had
previously ruled that an action for damages is available under Title VI, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976),
in Guardian's Ass'n of New York City v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 633 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1980). The
analogy to Title VI was a key factor in the Supreme Court's decision in Cannon finding an implied
private right of action under Title IX.
279. 658 F.2d 1205 (7th Cir. 1981).
280. 20 U.S.C. § 1401-61 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
281. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
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award might be appropriate.28 2 In summarizing its position, the court
stated:
Congress enacted the EAHCA in order to aid the states in educating
their handicapped children by providing the necessary funds. The
legislative history shows an emphasis on procedural safeguards to en-
sure appropriate placements, a recognition that diagnosis of special
education problems was difficult and uncertain, an awareness of se-
vere budgeting constraints, and an acknowledgment that it would
take time for all handicapped children to be helped. In those circum-
stances, and without even a word of discussion about damages, we
infer that the remedy was not generally intended.283
Two examples of exceptional circumstances which might justify an
award of damages were given. First is where parents make alternate
arrangements to those offered by the school system in order to avoid a
serious risk of injury to the child's physical health. Where a court sub-
sequently determines that such alternative arrangements were neces-
sary to protect the health of the child and should have been provided
by the school system, the courts have the power to reimburse parents
for the costs of the alternative placement. 284 The second circumstance
is where a school system acts in bad faith in failing to make available
the procedural protections of the EAHCA which could result in an ap-
propriate placement. If the parents unilaterally arrange for the appro-
priate placement, they should be awarded money damages for the cost
of such services in the event they ultimately prevail in court.
285
While the decisions in Lieberman and Anderson are consistent in
that both refuse to imply a damage remedy under a federal statute
which is silent on the topic, Judge Swygert's dissent in Lieberman is
somewhat curious because he wrote the Anderson opinion only a few
weeks earlier and it is not mentioned in Lieberman. There are some
obvious differences in the statutes involved. For example, Title IX
does not expressly deal with right of action whereas the EAHCA pro-
vides for judicial review but is silent on the subject of damages. 28 6
Maybe it is more difficult to imply a right to damages when Congress
expressly provides a right of action but fails to mention damages than
where Congress doesn't expressly address either. Nevertheless, the
282. 658 F.2d at 1213. On this point, the opinion of Judge Swygert should be compared with
his dissent, written only a few weeks later, in Lieberman v. Univ. of Chicago, 660 F.2d 1185 (7th
Cir. 1981).
283. Id
284. Tatro v. Texas, 516 F. Supp. 968 (N.D. Tex. 1981), is given as an example of such a
circumstance. See also, William S. v. Gill, 536 F. Supp. 505 (N.D. Il. 1982).
285. 658 F.2d at 1214.
286. It should be noted that the EAHCA gives the courts power to "grant such relief as the
court determines is appropriate." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2) (1976).
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concern expressed in Anderson for the budget constraints of states and
local school systems is the same concern expressed by the majority in
Lieberman. There is a split of authority on the question of whether
damages are available for violations of the EAHCA;287 however, Judge
Swygert's well written opinion in Anderson seems persuasive to most
courts addressing the issue. 288
The court next turned to the question whether § 1983 could be
used to enforce the EAHCA, thereby making fees available under
§ 1988.289 Relying on Pennhurst, the court stated that "despite
Thiboutot, section 1983 is not available in situations 'where the gov-
erning statute provides an exclusive remedy for violations of the
Act.' "290 The EAHCA does not expressly indicate that it provides an
exclusive remedy. To determine whether the statutory remedy under
the EAHCA was intended to be exclusive, the court looked to Brown v.
General Services Administration291 and Great American Federal Savings
& Loan Association v. Novotny .292 In essence these cases direct the
courts to an examination of the legislative history and the structure of
the statute to determine whether or not Congress intended it to be ex-
clusive. As with the implied right of action inquiry, the courts are left
to struggle with the question of what Congress intended when there is
frequently no indication of its intent.293
Applying this to the EAHCA, the court indicated that it, "like the
statutes at issue in Brown and Novotny, contains an elaborate adminis-
trative and judicial enforcement system. ' 294 Next, the court indicated
287. 658 F.2d at 1210 n.9.
288. See, e.g., Ruth Anne M. v. Alvin Indep. School Dist., 532 F. Supp. 460, 464-69 (S.D. Tex.
1982); Jaworski v. Rhode Island Bd. of Regents for Educ., 530 F. Supp. 60, 62-64 (D. R.I. 1981);
Reineman v. Valley View Community School Dist. #365-U, 527 F. Supp. 661, 664-65 (N.D. Il.
1981).
289. Although not expressly addressed in the opinion, if § 1983 is available to enforce the
EAHCA, then presumably a plaintiff could seek damages as well as injunctive relief even if the
EAHCA itself does not provide for damages. This is true because § 1983 provides for damages. It
could, however, be argued that § 1983 is available but only to the extent it is not inconsistent with
the EAHCA. If this is true, then the availability of § 1983 serves only to make attorney fees
available. This is obviously an important function.
290. 658 F.2d at 1215, quoting from Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 28.
291. 425 U.S. 820 (1976) (§ 717 of Title VII provides the exclusive judicial remedy for employ-
ment discrimination claims of federal employees).
292. 442 U.S. 366 (1979) (42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) creates no substantive rights and cannot be
utilized to enforce Title VII).
293. While the task is certainly similar, the test should be different. See, e.g. Ryans v. New
Jersey Comm'n for the Blind, 542 F. Supp. 841, 846-49 (D. N.J., 1982); Note, Preclusion of Section
1983 Causes of Action by Comprehensive Statutory Remedial Schemes, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1183
(1982).
294. 658 F.2d at 1216. The validity of this reason is questioned in Bodensteiner,Avaiabiity of
Attorney Fees in Suits to Enforce the Educational Rights of Children with Handicaps, 5 W. NEW.
ENG. L. REv. -, - (1983) [hereinafter Bodensteiner].
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that Congress when enacting the EAHCA also believed that the rights
it was creating had heretofore been inadequately protected under fed-
eral law.295 Finally, what the court considered the most compelling rea-
son for its conclusion that the EAHCA provides the exclusive remedy
"is that the relief it provides is inconsistent with section 1983 relief. 296
According to the court, the two are inconsistent because § 1983 pro-
vides for damages whereas it had already concluded that the EAHCA
does not provide for damages absent exceptional circumstances. In
summary the court stated:
the availability of a private right of action under the EAHCA, the
detailed statutory administrative and judicial scheme, the fact that
Congress intended the EAHCA to create new rights, and the absence
of a traditional damage remedy, together compel our conclusion that
the judicial remedy provided in the EAHCA was intended to be
exclusive. 297
Lower courts are divided as to the availability of § 1983 to enforce
the EAHCA. A contrary district court decision in Tatro v. Texas298
was specifically rejected in Anderson .299 Several courts have held that
§ 1983 is available and awarded fees under § 1988 in cases enforcing
rights under the EAHCA, 3°° while others have relied upon Anderson in
rejecting the use of § 1983.30 One other appellate court, without citing
Anderson, similarly held that § 1983 is not available to enforce the
EAHCA. 30 2
A question not necessarily answered by Anderson is whether a
295. Clearly the EAHCA was a recognition that the rights of handicapped children were not
being adequately protected by the states and the local schools, but Congress was definitely not
suggesting that handicapped children did not previously have a right to an equal educational
opportunity. In fact, the legislative history of the relevant provisions of the EAHCA makes it
quite apparent that Congress was acting to assist the states in complying with decisions establish-
ing the right of handicapped children to an equal educational opportunity under the fourteenth
amendment. See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 168, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 5-7, reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 1429-31. ("In recent years decisions in more than 36 court cases in the States
have recognized the rights of handicapped children to an appropriate education.") Id at 1431.
See also Bodensteiner, supra note 294.
296. 658 F.2d at 1216. This reason is questioned in Bodensteiner, supra note 294.
297. Id. at 1217.
298. 516 F. Supp. 968, 984 (N.D. Tex. 1981). This case held that Thiboutot controls and
§ 1983 is available so long as the plaintiff exhausts the administrative remedies under 20 U.S.C.
§ 1415; however, because § 1983 would add nothing to the EAHCA claim other than to trigger an
award of fees under § 1988, the court held that it could not be used.
299. 658 F.2d at 1215.
300. See, e.g., Robert M. v. Benton, 671 F.2d 1104, 1106 (8th Cir. 1982); Jose P. v. Ambach,
669 F.2d 865, 871 (2d Cir. 1982); Hymes v. Harnett County Bd. of Educ., 664 F.2d 410, 413 (4th
Cir. 1981); Department of Educ., State of Hawaii v. Katherine D., 531 F. Supp. 517, 531 (D.
Hawaii 1982); Mattie T. v. Holladay, 522 F. Supp. 72, 74 (N.D. Miss. 1981).
301. See, e.g., Ruth Anne M. v. Alvin Indep. School Dist., 532 F. Supp. 460, 473-75 (S.D. Tex.
1982); Akers v. Bolten, 531 F. Supp. 300, 316 (D. Kan. 1981).
302. McGovern v. Sullins, 676 F.2d 98, 99 (4th Cir. 1982).
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plaintiff can use § 1983 to enforce rights under the EAHCA when a
state refuses to provide an administrative remedy mandated under
§ 615 of the EAHCA. 30 3 In this situation plaintiffs can challenge the
state's lack of an administrative process mandated by § 615(e) or its
unwillingness to apply the appropriate procedural protections. Because
§ 615(e)(2) provides jurisdiction in the courts only after exhaustion of
administrative remedies, they might be prevented from enforcing the
procedural protections mandated by the Act. The question is whether
such plaintiffs can proceed in court under § 1983 seeking to require the
state to implement the procedures mandated by the EAHCA. In
Hymes v. Harnett County Board of Education304 the court awarded fees
under § 1988 because "no judicial relief route is provided in the
EAHCA, to prevent an alteration of the educational placement of a
child, pending administrative determination (and any appeal therefrom
to the courts). ' 305 Depending on how strictly § 615(e)(2) is interpreted,
a plaintiff in this situation, in contrast to the situation in Anderson, may
be without a remedy under the EAHCA and therefore § 1983 should
still be available.
Anderson demonstrates the complexity of the issues caused by the
Supreme Court's retreat from Thiboutot in Pennhurst and National Sea
Clammers. The latter part of the inquiry demanded by Pennhurst and
National Sea Clammers, i e., whether the federal statute at issue creates
any rights or privileges for the plaintiffs, is of course unavoidable. As-
suming a cause of action is available through § 1983, the courts will
always have to decide what, if any, substantive rights are provided by
the federal statute. This is really all Pennhurst dealt with.3°6 The other
aspect of the inquiry, ie., whether Congress has forclosed private en-
forcement of the statute in the enactment itself, leads to the inquiry
which Judge Swygert stated in Lieberman "can best be analogized to
the medieval practice of counting angels on the head of a pin."'30 7 Of
course, if Congress expressly indicates that a remedy provided in the
substantive statute itself is intended to be exclusive, that indication
would preclude the use of § 1983. On the other hand, where Congress
303. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e). This issue is currently pending before the Seventh Circuit in Doe v.
Koger, appeal docketed, No. 85-567 (7th Cir. May 19, 1982).
304. 664 F.2d 410, 413 (4th Cir. 1981).
305. See also, Tatro v. State of Texas, 658 F.2d at 984, where the court, after concluding that a
§ 1983 action is available as long as the plaintiff has exhausted administrative remedies under
§ 615(e), stated: "[wihatever may be the role of § 1983 where the attack is upon the adequacy of
procedures themselves, this court sees no role for § 1983 here."
306. See Judge Swygert's dissenting opinion in Lieberman, 660 F.2d at 1189-90.
307. 660 F.2d at 1193.
CIVIL LIBERTIES
either does not explicitly deal with the question of remedy, or provides
a partial remedy but does not exclude other remedies, why should it
not be assumed that Congress is fully aware of § 1983 and intends it to
be available absent a clear indication to the contrary? This would be
simple and consistent with the principle of Bell v. Hood which, accord-
ing to Judge Swygert, "alleviates the tensions inherent in this separa-
tion of powers problem. 30
8
Most of the court of appeals decisions since Pennhurst and Na-
tional Sea Clammers have avoided the more difficult question by con-
cluding that the plaintiff either has - no rights under the substantive
federal statute or did not state a violation of the statute. 30 9 Another
court summarily concluded, relying on Thiboutot and Cuyler v. Ad-
ams,310 that a plaintiff could use § 1983 to enforce the Interstate Agree-
ment on Detainers. 311 Unfortunately, what could be a very simple
issue if the teaching of Bell v. Hood were not ignored, seems destined to
result in endless litigation just as the Cort v. Ash analysis has resulted in
a waste of judicial resources attempting to determine whether or not an
implied right of action exists.
Finally, the court considered the question whether a federal em-
ployee has an implied right of action for damages under the fifth
amendment following what she claimed to be a forced retirement from
her position as curator of the Fort Sheridan Museum. 31 2 The lower
court dismissed the case primarily on the grounds that there was an
alternative remedy before the Civil Service Commission. In reversing
and remanding for trial the Seventh Circuit applied the test adopted in
Carlson v. Green31 3 indicating that a remedy exists for such constitu-
tional violations unless one of two exceptions is present: "(1) special
factors counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by
Congress and (2) an alternative remedy provided by Congress. ' 314 The
court found that neither exception applies. Concerning the alternative
administrative remedy, the court noted that it does not cover coerced
308. Id
309. See, e.g., Uniformed Firefighters Ass'n v. City of New York, 676 F.2d 20, 22-23 (2d Cir.
1982); Local Div. 732, Etc. v. Metropolitan Atlanta, Etc., 667 F.2d 1327, 1345-46 (11 th Cir. 1982);
Perry v. Housing Auth. of City of Charleston, 664 F.2d 1210, 1217-18 (4th Cir. 1981); Brown v.
Sibley, 650 F.2d 760, 764-65 (5th Cir. 1981).
310. 449 U.S. 433 (1981).
311. Bush v. Muncy, 659 F.2d 402, 406 (4th Cir. 1981). See also, Ryans v. New Jersey
Comn'n for the Blind and Visually Impaired, 542 F. Supp. 841 (D.N.J. 1982) (§ 1983 is available
to handicapped individuals to enforce Title I of the 1973 Rehabilitation Act).
312. Sonntag v. Dooley, 650 F.2d 904 (7th Cir. 1981).
313. 446 U.S. at 14, 18-19 (1980).
314. 650 F.2d at 906.
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resignations and, even if it did, the only relief available is reinstatement
and back pay. The plaintiff here seeks damages rather than
reinstatement. 31 5
B. Attorney Fees
The court decided a number of cases this term raising questions of
entitlement to attorney fees under either the Civil Rights Attorney's
Fees Awards Act 316 or Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.3 17 Sev-
eral of the cases reflect the amount of discretion given to the trial judge
in making the attorney fee determination. Another group of cases con-
fronts the difficult question of whether or not a plaintiff has prevailed.
A few decisions uphold lower court awards of attorney fees to prevail-
ing defendants, while recognizing the very strict standard for such
awards. Finally, two of the decisions dealt extensively with the factors
to be considered in determining the proper amount of fees to award.3 18
Generally speaking the awarding of attorney fees is subject to the
discretion of the trial court and will be reversed only for an abuse of
discretion. The Court of Appeals can, of course, still review the "legal
correctness," 319 of the district court ruling and reverse "[i]f a judge er-
roneously thought the law required him to do what he did. '320 Obvi-
ously, the more reasons and detail given by the trial judge in making an
award, the more meaningful the opportunity for review by the Court of
Appeals.32' In Whitley v. Seibe 322 the plaintiff's attorney sought fees
for 277 hours at the rate of $110.00 per hour plus a multiplier. The
lower court awarded $10,000, to be divided among the attorneys as
they chose. Although the amount awarded was less than one third of
that requested, there did not seem to be a detailed statement of the
reasons for the lower court decision. Nevertheless, the court identified
several factors-a lower rate than requested for trial time and an even
lesser rate for office time; some duplication of effort by the two attor-
315. Id at 907.
316. 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
317. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k).
318. These two cases, relying on Bond v. Stanton, 630 F.2d 1231, 1235 (7th Cir. 1980), confirm
a prevailing plaintiffs entitlement to fees for time spent litigating and establishing the right to fees.
They are Balark v. Curtin, 655 F.2d 798, 802-03 (7th Cit. 1981) (including the right to fees for time
spent defending a fee award before the Supreme Court), and Brown v. Smith, 662 F.2d 464, 470
n.7 (7th Cir. 1981).
319. Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Mfg. Co., Inc., 665 F.2d 149, 162 (7th Cir. 1981).
320. Chrapliwy v. Uniroyal, Inc., 670 F.2d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 1982).
321. Whitley v. Seibel, 676 F.2d 245, 253-54 (7th Cir. 1982); Loctite Corp. v. Fel-Pro, Inc., 667
F.2d 577, 585 (7th Cir. 1981).
322. 676 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1982).
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neys with a challenge to 56 hours on this basis; the fact that the case
redressed an individual wrong rather than benefiting a class or vindi-
cating the public interest; and the fact that there was a substantial mon-
etary judgment and a contingent fee agreement between the attorneys
and client-which represent a reasonable basis for the fees awarded by
the lower court.323 The case suggests that, while a detailed statement of
the reasons for an award are obviously useful on review, the appellate
court should examine the full record closely in an effort to justify the
lower court award.324
More detailed findings and conclusions by the lower court on
questions of duplication of effort, the factual and legal complexity of
the case and the amount of time spent by the attorneys on certain tasks
made it relatively easy for the Court of Appeals to uphold the fee
award in Patterson v. Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. 325 Similarly, in
upholding an award of fees to the defendants in Reichenberger v.
Pritchard326 the court was able to rely on an explicit finding of the trial
court that the case satisfied the Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC327
criteria for awarding fees to a prevailing defendant. Factual findings
are also important in determining whether or not plaintiffs have pre-
vailed in some cases. In Stewart v. Hannon,328 a case challenging a
written examination used in determining promotions from the position
of assistant principal to principal in the Chicago public schools, the
defendants decided not to use the 1978 examination results once they
realized their use had an adverse impact on minorities. The question is
whether the plaintiffs prevailed in a "practical sense", a determination
which requires consideration of two criteria: "(1) whether the litigation
benefited the plaintiff and the class, and (2) whether the lawsuit acted
as a catalyst, or was a material factor in the defendant's decision to
change the disputed practices .... ,"329 Both of these criteria raise fact
questions which are to be determined by the district court and the court
found sufficient evidence in the record to support the lower court's find-
ing that the plaintiffs were not the prevailing parties. 330
The situation and holding in Stewart should be compared with
323. Id at 253-54.
324. See also, Harrington v. Devito, 656 F.2d 264, 269 (7th Cir. 1981) (the record supports an
implicit finding of the lower court and "an abuse of discretion only occurs where no reasonable
person could take the view adopted by the trial court").
325. 659 F.2d 736, 740-41 (7th Cir. 1981).
326. 660 F.2d 280, 288-89 (7th Cir. 1981).
327. 434 U.S. 412 (1978).
328. 675 F.2d 846 (7th Cir. 1982).
329. Id at 851, citing Dawson v. Pastrick, 600 F.2d 70, 78 (7th Cir. 1979).
330. Id at 851-52.
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that in Harrington v. DeVito.331 Here the parties settled the case by
consent decree and the court subsequently awarded the plaintiffs
$25,000.00 in fees, finding that they prevailed against both the state and
county defendant officials. When the defendants were unable to agree
to an allocation of the liability for fees, the court ordered the county
defendants to pay 80% and the state defendants 20% of the fee award.
The state officials, on appeal, claimed that the allocation of fees against
the state constituted an abuse of discretion because the plaintiffs had
not prevailed against the state. Here the court looked to guidelines for
determining prevailing party status, adopted in cases resolved by settle-
ment. Relying on cases decided by the First and Eighth Circuits, 332 the
court stated that in order "to prevail in a settled case, the plaintiffs'
lawsuit must be causally linked to the achievement of the relief ob-
tained. Secondly, the defendant must not have acted wholly gratui-
tously, ie. the plaintiffs' claims, if pressed, cannot have been frivolous,
unreasonable, or groundless." 333
The court went on to explain that the first step requires that the
lawsuit play a "provocative role" in obtaining relief and that this repre-
sents a factual determination. The record supports the lower court's
implicit conclusion that the state officials took actions in response to the
lawsuit. 334 The second inquiry under this test, whether the defendants
acted gratuitously, requires a determination of whether the plaintiffis
claim was "frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff
continued to litigate after it clearly became so."' 335 Here the court
found that the lower court had implicitly rejected the state's contention
that its role was purely voluntary by making an award of fees. 336
While both Stewart and Harrington involve a determination of
whether plaintiffs had prevailed even though there had not been a judi-
cial determination on the merits, the tests articulated by the court ap-
pear different. Maybe this is because Harrington resulted in a consent
decree whereas the plaintiffs argument in Stewart was based, not on a
consent decree, but rather on a change in the defendants' position. It is
not clear, however, why this difference should dictate a different test.
Stewart was decided subsequent to Harrington and it never mentioned
Harrington.
331. 656 F.2d 264 (7th Cir. 1981).
332. United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 622 F.2d 342, 345-47 (8th Cir. 1980); Nadeau v.
Helgemoe, 581 F.2d 275, 279 (1st Cir. 1978).
333. 656 F.2d at 266-67.
334. Id at 267.
335. Id at 268, quoting from Nadeau v. Helgemoe, 581 F.2d at 281.
336. Id
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A very difficult attorney fee issue arises when plaintiffs clearly pre-
vail on one or more claims, but less than all of the claims raised in the
litigation. The plaintiff in Syvock v. Milwaukee Boiler Manufacturing
Co. 337 brought an action under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act 338 claiming the defendant had laid him off and failed to rehire him
in violation of the Act. A jury trial was held on the liability phase and
it found that the defendant willfully discriminated against the plaintiff,
thus entitling him to liquidated damages under the Act. The court sub-
sequently upheld the jury's finding of discrimination but granted the
defendant a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the jury's deter-
mination of willfulness, thus preventing double damages. The court
also found that the plaintiff had failed to mitigate his damages and
awarded a lesser amount accordingly. The lower court awarded attor-
ney fees, but only for seventy hours instead of the requested 400
hours. 339 The Court of Appeals upheld the initial reduction to 200
hours and the refusal to apply a 25% multiplier; however, it found that
the trial court erred in its interpretation of Muscare v. Quinn .340
Recognizing some apparent inconsistencies within the Circuit, the
court examined three prior decisions 34' in some detail and attempted to
reconcile them. The first, Muscare v. Quinn, was characterized by the
Syvock court as a case where the plaintiff presented two independent
claims for relief, i e., a first amendment challenge to a regulation and a
due process challenge to the procedures utilized in suspending him, and
prevailed on only one of them. In contrast, the court found that
Syvock presented only one claim, i e., that the defendant discriminated
against him under the ADEA because of his age, and the plaintiff "es-
sentially succeeded" in this claim. He prevailed in his ADEA claim
even though he failed to establish willfulness and that he had mitigated
damages. However, that failure did not justify diminishing his award
of attorney fees. 342
The court then went on to find that the other two circuit decisions,
Sherkow v. Wisconsin Department of Public Instruction and Busche v.
337. 665 F.2d 149 (7th Cir. 1981).
338. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976).
339. 665 F.2d at 162-63. The fee request was reduced from 400 to 200 hours based upon the
factors required under Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 502 F.2d 1309,
1322 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997 (1976), and then further reduced from 200 to 70 on
the basis of Muscare v. Quinn, 614 F.2d 577, 580 (7th Cir. 1980).
340. 614 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1980).
341. Muscare v. Quinn, 614 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1980); Busche v. Burkee, 649 F.2d 509 (7th Cir.
1981); Sherkow v. Wisconsin Dept. of Public Instruction, 630 F.2d 498 (7th Cir. 1980).
342. 665 F.2d at 164.
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Burkee, are consistent with Muscare. As noted in Syvock, 3 4 3 the
Sherkow opinion is not clear as to which part of plaintiff's claim was
unsuccessful. The court in Sherkow simply stated: "[s]ince the plaintiff
prevailed in part but not as to her entire claim against the defendant,
should her recovery of attorneys' fees and expenses be reduced accord-
ingly?"' 34 After quoting extensively from a Sixth Circuit decision,
Northcross v. Board of Education of Memphis City Schools,345 the court
in Sherkow simply concluded that "[o]nce it is determined a plaintiff
has prevailed, then the plaintiff is entitled to recover for all the time
reasonably spent on a matter."'346 The apparent adoption of the North-
cross test could reasonably lead one to believe that Sherkow is incon-
sistent with Busche. The Northcross test for § 1988 cases is simply
whether the plaintiff prevailed "on the case as a whole. ' 347 A different
panel of the Seventh Circuit in Busche had rejected the Northcross test
and completely ignored Sherkow .348 Under the Busche test the plaintiff
has to demonstrate the number of hours attributable to the prosecution
of successful claims and this calculation "presumably includes time
spent on unsuccessful claims to the extent such time would have been
spent in connection with the successful claims even if the unsuccessful
claims had not been brought. '349
The plaintiff in Busche alleged that his procedural due process
rights were violated in the termination of his employment as a police
officer. According to the court in Syvock, Busche asserted three in-
dependent claims against the defendants-"that the charges filed
against him before the Commission were constitutionally insufficient,
that the Commission's written findings and conclusions were constitu-
tionally deficient, and that his termination was unlawful because he
was afforded no pretermination hearing" 35 0 - and he prevailed on only
the third. The court in Syvock further characterized the unsuccessful
claims in Busche as independent, like those in Muscare, in that they
were "not mere aspects of a larger claim that affected the amount of
damages he was due for for the claim on which he did succeed."' 35
Thus, the four cases are apparently reconciled as follows: the
343. Id at 164 n.22.
344. 630 F.2d 498, 504 (7th Cir. 1980).
345. 611 F.2d 624, 635-36 (6th Cir. 1979).
346. 630 F.2d at 504.
347. 611 F.2d at 636.
348. 649 F.2d 509, 522 (7th Cir. 1981). In rejecting Northcross, the court noted that it might
have considerable merit but found it "at odds with the formulation" adopted in Muscare. Id.
349. Id at 521.
350. 665 F.2d at 164.
351. Id. at 165.
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plaintiffs in Busche and Muscare presented independent claims and
prevailed on less than all of them; the plaintiff in Sherkow claimed
unlawful sex discrimination by reason of the defendant's failure to pro-
mote her and the subsequent retaliation against her and she prevailed
on both; the plaintiff in Syvock presented one claim of age discrimina-
tion and essentially succeeded. 352 The critical inquiry seems to relate to
the independence of the separate claims. The closer they are related
and the more they rely on the actions of the same defendants and the
same fact situation, the easier it is to argue that a plaintiff has "essen-
tially succeeded. '353
Considerable deference was shown to the trial courts which
awarded fees to prevailing defendants under § 1988 and Title VII.354 In
Reichenberger v. Pritchard355 the court identified four factors to be con-
sidered in determining whether prevailing defendants are entitled to
fees. These are (1) whether the issue is one of first impression;
(2) whether the controversy is sufficiently based upon a real threat of
injury to the plaintiff; (3) whether the trial court made a finding that the
suit was frivolous; and (4) whether the record would support such a
finding.356 The plaintiffs in that case were owners and operators of two
nightclubs which sell liquor and present nude dancing entertainment.
They claimed that the defendants had conspired to eliminate the nude
dancing by interfering in various municipal administrative proceedings
involving the operation of the nightclubs. Because of the plaintiffs'
"threshold inability to allege injury or deprivation of constitutional
rights, '357 the court found that it fell within the Christiansburg guide-
lines. In addition, the court noted that the defendants had a clear de-
fense in that they were exercising first amendment rights of speech,
assembly, and petition.358
A suit against municipal officials to enjoin the collection of prop-
erty taxes and recover damages was found to be meritless if the plaintiff
"should have known that his claim for injunctive relief would be dis-
missed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. ' 359 As to the claim for
352. Id
353. Apparently it was argued in a couple of cases that a plaintiff must prevail on all claims in
order to be considered the prevailing party. This is clearly not correct. See Tidwell v. Schweiker,
677 F.2d 560, 568-69 (7th Cir. 1982); Brown v. Smith, 662 F.2d 464, 469 (7th Cir. 1981).
354. The court also summarily found that a lower court which had denied fees to a prevailing
defendant had not abused its discretion. Dusanek v. Hannon, supra note 84, at 543.
355. 660 F.2d 280 (7th Cir. 1981).
356. Id at 288.
357. Id
358. Id
359. Werch v. City of Berlin, 673 F.2d 192, 195 (7th Cir. 1982).
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damages, the court upheld the district court's determination that it was
meritless because the plaintiff "knew that there were no facts or infer-
ences that could reasonably support a finding that defendants acted in
bad faith. ' 360 Even though the court recognized that under Gomez v.
Toledo 361 the plaintiff did not have to plead bad faith, he did plead that
the defendants had acted maliciously, intentionally and recklessly but
attached exhibits which seemed to contradict these allegations.
In a final case awarding fees to a prevailing defendant, Bugg v.
International Union of Allied Industrial Workers of America,362 the
court considered the question of whether fees should be awarded to a
defendant/appellee who prevails on appeal in a Title VII case. The
award of fees to the defendant for the trial work was not contested on
appeal. Relying in part in Bond v. Stanton,363 the court found no rea-
son to distinguish between trial and appellate time under Title VII.
The question then would be whether the plaintiff's appeal falls within
the Christiansburg guidelines and the determination by the district
court that the original action was frivolous or meritless is not necessar-
ily determinative, although it is probative. 36 In awarding fees to the
defendant/appellee on appeal the court noted that the arguments on
appeal were essentially the same as those rejected by the lower court,
the additional allegations were either collateral or meritless, the plain-
tiff/appellant had consumed considerable time and energy of both the
court and defendant's counsel by repeatedly attempting to modify the
record and the appellate court had explicitly rejected the plaintiffs mo-
tion for appointment of counsel.365 While recognizing the danger of
discouraging valid claims by awarding fees to defendants/appellees, in
view of the frivolity, unreasonableness and lack of foundation for the
appeal, the court found that this case was appropriate for such an
award.
Three cases dealt quite extensively with issues involved in deter-
mining the amount of fees to award a prevailing plaintiff. In a Title
VII case, Chrapiwy v. Uniroyal, Inc. ,366 the parties settled the case on
the merits with the defendant agreeing to pay attorney fees in an
amount to be established by the court. While indicating that the Sev-
enth Circuit had never expressly adopted the "lodestar" method, the
360. Id at 196.
361. 446 U.S. 635 (1980).
362. 674 F.2d 595 (7th Cir. 1982).
363. 630 F.2d 1231 (7th Cir. 1980).
364. 674 F.2d at 600 n.10.
365. Id at 600-01.
366. 670 F.2d 760 (7th Cir. 1982).
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court did indicate it had approved using "hours times billing rate" as a
convenient starting point in determining a fee award and making any
necessary adjustments upward or downward based on the factors estab-
lished in Waters.367 In concluding that the 11,000 hours expended by
counsel for the plaintiffs was not unreasonable, the court seemed influ-
enced by the fact that counsel for the defendant had spent the same
number of hours on the case.368 The court also held that the lower
court erred in excluding the hours of plaintiffs' counsel spent in efforts
to persuade the federal government to debar the defendant from its
federal contracts. 369
Determining a reasonable billing rate was complicated in this case
by the fact that some of the plaintiffs' attorneys practice in Washington,
D.C. and New York where the billing rates are substantially higher
than South Bend, where the case was litigated. The district court, while
indicating that the congressional policy of § 706(k) would not be ad-
vanced by limiting plaintiffs' counsel to the local rate and noting that
the requested rate must be balanced against the local rate, nevertheless
awarded only the local rate of $85.00 per hour. The Seventh Circuit
reversed holding that, while the rate customarily charged in the locality
remains a factor, non-local attorneys should not be precluded from re-
covering their usual rate where they have specialized skills not readily
available in the locality where the case is tried.370 In other words, it is
reasonable for a party to look outside of the local area if necessary to
find an attorney with specialized skills and it is also reasonable to com-
pensate a specialist at a higher rate.
The final issue in Chrapilwy concerns the district court's upward
adjustment of the basic fee in the amount of $50,000.00 because of the
367. Id at 763-64 n.5. See Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 502 F.2d
1309 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997 (1976). A "lodestar" amount is determined by
multiplying the allowable hours worked by a reasonable hourly rate.
368. An earlier case, Mirabal v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 576 F.2d 729, 730-31 (7th
Cir. 1978), which might suggest that a comparison between plaintiffs and defendant's counsel is
improper, was distinguished by the court. 670 F.2d at 768 n.18.
369. The Seventh Circuit stated:
We think [the lower court's] interpretation of Section 706(k) is too narrow. The
plaintiffs at all times pursued their Title VII action. Their efforts to have the defendant
debarred from its federal contracts on the basis of the same discrimination charged in the
Title VII action were designed to move the Title VII case toward ultimate disposition.
This desired effect was achieved, because the threat of debarment on account of discrimi-
nation caused the defendant to settle the Title VII action. Thus, the plaintiffs' pursuit of
debarment was a service which contributed to the ultimate termination of the Title VII
action, and in that sense was within the Title VII action.
670 F.2d at 767. This interpretation was found to be consistent with New York Gaslight Club,
Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54 (1980).
370. 670 F.2d at 768-69.
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risk involved and $200,000.00 for the quality of representation. As to
the risk factor, the Seventh Circuit affirmed stating that "[flifty thou-
sand dollars to account for the risks involved in representing the plain-
tiffs on a contingent basis in a complex class action is a modest, if not
meager, award.'" 37' As to the quality factor, the court indicated that the
lower court's consideration of quality was appropriate; however, it was
remanded for further consideration on this issue in light of the holding
that the Washington and New York attorneys were entitled to their
customary rates. To allow both the higher basic fee and the quality
adjustment could result in overlap and the case was therefore re-
manded on this issue.372
The question of the appropriateness of an incentive or multiplier
also arose in two other cases. In Bonner v. Coughlin 373 the district court
allowed a multiplier on reconsideration after originally denying it. On
appeal it was decided that the case was not appropriate for use of a
multiplier for the following reasons: the contingent nature of the fee
does not alone justify use of a multiplier; while plaintiffs counsel was
skilled in prison rights litigation, the result obtained-a $100.00 judg-
ment-was minimal; there was some question about the reasonableness
of the number of hours claimed; the significance of the precedential
value of the decision is questionable; undesirability is less of a factor
when the attorney specializes in such cases; and there was no indication
that representation in this case precluded other employment. 374 Fi-
nally, the delay between the time some of the legal services were ren-
dered and actual payment, while a factor in determining fee awards,
does not justify a multiplier if fees are awarded at current rates prevail-
ing in the locality, rather than the presumably lower rates at the time
the services were rendered. 375 Finally, in Tidwell v. Schweiker 376 the
court concluded that it was an abuse of discretion for the lower court to
attach a 1.5 multiplier to the attorney fees awarded to the plaintiff. The
multiplier was based on the importance of the results achieved; the
Court of Appeals recognized the importance of the results but did not
agree that they justified the multiplier.377
371. Id at 770.
372. Id
373. 657 F.2d 931 (7th Cir. 1981).
374. Id at 936-37.
375. Id. at 937. The court also held that it was not an abuse of discretion to compensate both
in court and out of court time at the same rate. This assumes, of course, that the rate does not
reflect the normally higher rate for in court time. Id.
376. 677 F.2d 560, 570 (7th Cir. 1982).
377. The court did, however, recognize that in some cases the results alone might justify a
multiplier. Id. at 570 n.14. It is not clear why the results alone did not justify a multiplier in this
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Tidwell also dealt with two other issues: whether there was dupli-
cation on the part of plaintiffs' counsel and whether the state defend-
ants could be held responsible for fees relating to issues which they
claim involved only federal defendants. As to duplication, the court
agreed with the district court that there was no duplication of effort
primarily because there were two sets of plaintiffs and, after the cases
were consolidated, attorneys for one set of plaintiffs were designated as
lead counsel. Most of the hours billed by the other attorneys related to
work done prior to consolidation. 378 Obviously, a clear delineation of
the respective duties and responsibilities of counsel helps to avoid a
duplication argument. As to the remaining issue, whether the federal
officials only were culpable, the lower court found that a conspiracy
existed between the two sets 'of defendants. Therefore, the lower
court's finding that both federal and state defendants were liable was
well within its discretion.379
C. Other Enforcement Issues
The court faced several other issues which are quite common in
civil rights litigation. Three of them-state action, the article III case
or controversy requirement and qualified official immunity-will be
discussed. 380
1. State Action
In Bloomer Shippers Association v. Illinois Central Gulf Railroad
Co. 381 the plaintiffs claimed that the Illinois Central, in retaliation for
case. The state statutory and regulatory scheme involving the use of the challenged form was
found invalid under the supremacy clause on behalf of a class consisting of all past and present
patients in state mental institutions whose disability benefits were wrongfully appropriated by the
state. The court did note that the facts are relatively simple and the suit, while novel, was not so
different or unique as to warrant a multiplier. Id at 570.
378. 677 F.2d at 570.
379. Id at 569.
380. Other cases involving relatively uncontroversial civil rights issues include Richardson v.
City of Indianapolis, 658 F.2d 494, 501 n.1 (7th Cir. 1981) (in a § 1983 action seeking damages
resulting from a shooting and killing by a police officer, an instruction to the effect that the of-
ficer's act resulting in the death "must have been intentional or motivated by maliciousness or by a
callous disregard for the consequences" is not erroneous); Id Reichenberger v. Pritchard, 660
F.2d 280 (7th Cir. 1981) (in an action alleging that the defendants conspired to eliminate nude
dancing in the plaintiff's nightclubs by interfering in municipal administrative proceedings, the
plaintiff did not state a cause of action because the injury complained of was too speculative,
tentative and hypothetical); United States of Am. v. 16.92 Acres of Land, Etc., No. 81-1190 (7th
Cir. filed Mar. 30, 1982) (an equal protection challenge to a federal statute governing eminent
domain proceedings and setting different classifications for property is governed by a "relatively
relaxed" rational basis standard which was met because the classification is rationally related to a
legitimate legislative goal).
381. 655 F.2d 772 (7th Cir. 1981).
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their complaint to the Interstate Commerce Commission, had unlaw-
fully discontinued service to a grain company and terminated the
plaintiffs' leases and attempted to evict them in state court. The plain-
tiffs argued that the defendant was subject to a § 1983 action because
1) it is a "heavily regulated utility" with its rates, regulations and prac-
tices subject to review by several state agencies, 2) it had eminent do-
main powers and 3) it was subject to the power of the State Commerce
Commission to approve or disapprove leases, sales or exchanges of
property. Although conceding that the Illinois Central is a "heavily
regulated utility," the court indicated the defendant did not act under
color of state law because there was not a sufficient nexus between the
state and the challenged action. Monopoly status alone is insufficient;
the service provided by the defendant is not a state function and the
mere fact that it is a business affected with the public interest does not
make its action "state action. ' 382 Further, the court found that the de-
fendant's use of the state courts for the forcible entry and detainer ac-
tions against some of the plaintiffs does not satisfy the state action
requirement under § 1983.383
To the extent the plaintiffs in Bloomer Shippers Association relied
on Illinois Central's forceable entry and detainer actions in the state
courts to establish that the defendant acted "under color of state law"
for § 1983 purposes, the case raises a question of the applicability of a
recent Supreme Court decision, Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co. 384 In
Lugar, the company obtained a pre-judgement writ of attachment is-
sued by a Virginia court clerk based on an ex parte petition alleging
Lugar was disposing or might dispose of his property to avoid his credi-
tors. After a hearing, thirty four days after issuance of the writ, the
state court dismissed the attachment order because the statutory
grounds for such attachment had not been satisfied.
Subsequently, Lugar brought an action under § 1983 against Ed-
mondson Oil Co. and its president claiming they had acted jointly with
the state to deprive him of his property without due process of law.
The complaint sought both compensatory and punitive damages for
losses caused by the improper attachment. Based on Flagg Brothers,
Inc. v. Brooks385 the district court dismissed the case on the grounds
382. Id at 776. In support of its conclusion the court cited the Supreme Court decisions in
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974), and Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis,
407 U.S. 163 (1972).
383. Id Here the court relied on Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
384. 102 S. Ct. 2744 (1982).
385. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
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that the actions of the defendants did not constitute state action as re-
quired by the fourteenth amendment. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the dismissal, but for a different reason. It indicated that while there
was "state action" as required by the fourteenth amendment, the com-
plaint did not allege conduct "under color of state law" as required by
§ 1983. The case thus raises the question of whether the "state action"
requirement of the fourteenth amendment is identical to the "under
color of state law" requirement of § 1983.
Confusion relating to this issue was unnecessarily caused by the
following statement in Flagg Brothers:
A claim upon which relief may be granted ... under § 1983 must
embody at least two elements. [Plaintiffs] are first bound to show
that they have been deprived of a right "secured by the Constitution
and laws" of the United States. They must secondly show that [the
defendant] deprived them of this right acting "under color of any
statute" of the State of New York. It is clear that these two elements
denote two separate areas of inquiry.386
Of course there are at least two elements of a § 1983 action, t e., does
the plaintiff meet the requirements of § 1983 and does the plaintiff have
any enforceable rights under the federal constitution or statutes. These
are obviously separate areas of inquiry. Accepting that, however, does
not imply that "state action" and "under color of state law" are differ-
ent requirements since there are additional inquiries necessary with re-
spect to each. 387
In Lugar, the Court first noted "it is clear that in a § 1983 action
brought against a state official, the statutory requirement of action
'under color of state law' and the 'state action' requirement of the Four-
teenth Amendment are identical." 38 8 Referring to the confusing state-
ment in Flagg Brothers, quoted above, the Court indicated this does not
mean that state action, if present, might not satisfy § 1983. The Court
attempted to reconcile its "two separate areas of inquiry" language
from Flagg Brothers with its holding in Lugar. It indicated the two are
not inconsistent because: (1) even though satisfying the state action re-
quirement of the fourteenth amendment satisfies the under color of law
requirement of § 1983, the reverse is not necessarily true; and (2) in
§ 1983 cases enforcing constitutional or statutory provisions which do
not require state action, the § 1983 requirement of action under color of
386. Id at 155-56.
387. For example, to establish a due process claim there must be a protected interest; the
availability of § 1983 to enforce federal statutes depends on whether Congress intended to fore-
close § 1983 as a conduit. See supra notes 289-311 and accompanying text.
388. 102 S. Ct. at 2750.
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state law would be a distinct element of the case not automatically sat-
isfied by a finding of a violation of the federal right.389
The first explanation is not very convincing, particularly in light of
the earlier statement to the effect that the two requirements are "identi-
cal." Also the Court gives no clue as to why "state action" should re-
quire more than "under color of state law."' 390 The second explanation
is the more logical and in essence means that Flagg Brothers never in-
tended to suggest that state action and under color of law were not
identical. All this suggests is that a § 1983 plaintiff must satisfy two
elements because § 1983 is only a conduit to enforce other rights.
Therefore, a plaintiff must not only demonstrate a violation of the sub-
stantive federal right involved, but also must meet the requirements of
§ 1983, including the under color of law requirement. 39'
Regarding the state action requirement, it was stated that prior
cases "have accordingly insisted that the conduct allegedly causing the
deprivation of a federal right be fairly attributable to the state. ' 392 De-
termining the "fair attribution" question requires a two part approach:
First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or
privilege created by the state or by a rule of conduct imposed by the
state or by a person for whom the state is responsible. . . . Second,
the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may
fairly be said to be a state actor. This may be because he is a state
official, because he has acted together with or has obtained signifi-
cant aid from state officials, or because his conduct is otherwise
chargeable to the state. 393
Application of this two part approach required the Court to review sep-
arately the two counts of the complaint relating to due process viola-
tions. The second count was interpreted to mean that the defendants
were charged with acting contrary to the relevant policy articulated by
the state. To the extent the state court plaintiff improperly invoked a
statute, this could not be attributed to a state rule or state decision and,
therefore, the first part of the test was not met.
As to count one, the complaint challenges the state statute provid-
ing for prejudgement attachment as being procedurally defective under
the due process clause. Clearly, the scheme created by the statute is the
product of state action. Therefore, the question was whether the sec-
389. Id at 2753 n.18.
390. If this were true it would indeed be surprising since the primary purpose of § 1983 is to
enforce the fourteenth amendment.
391. See supra note 387 and accompanying text.
392. 102 S. Ct. at 2754.
393. Id
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ond part of the test was met, t e., are the defendant company and its
president state actors?
Whatever may be true in other contexts, [invoking the aid of state
officials to take advantage of state created attachment procedures] is
sufficient when the state has created a system whereby state officials
will attach property on the ex parte application of one party to a
private dispute [to characterize the private party as a "state
actor"]. 394
In response to Justice Powell's concern that private individuals who
innocently use seemingly valid state statutes might be liable in damages
if the statute is subsequently held to be unconstitutional, the majority
indicated this "should be dealt with not by changing the character of
the cause of action but by establishing an affirmative defense. 395
Whether a qualified immunity should be available to such private indi-
viduals is a question the Court did not have to reach. 396
Because the plaintiff in Bloomer Shippers Association was not chal-
lenging Illinois' forcible entry and detainer statutes as violating due
process, but rather challenged the defendant's claimed retaliatory use
of the procedures, it would seem that Lugar should not change the re-
sult in this case.
2. Case or Controversy
Three decisions raised case or controversy issues under Article III.
In the first, Johnson v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago ,39 7 the
primary issue was whether the court should reconsider its holding relat-
ing to the constitutionality of student assignment plans based on racial
quotas. The plaintiff sought an injunction against the school board's
continued use of racial quotas which have the effect of requiring only
black children to be transported from their neighborhood schools. This
relief was sought after the school board and the Department of Justice,
in other litigation, had entered into a consent decree to develop a sys-
tem-wide integration plan and the board had voluntarily discontinued
use of the challenged quotas. The district court denied the injunction
and the court of appeals upheld this denial on the grounds that the
board's use of the quotas was constitutional. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari398 and then remanded the case for a determination of
394. Id at 2756-57.
395. Id at 2757 n.23.
396. Id
397. 664 F.2d 1069 (7th Cir. 1981).
398. 449 U.S. 915 (1980).
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whether the consent decree or any plan implementing the decree had
mooted the controversy.
Applying County of Los Angeles v. Davis,399 the court held that
"[a] case or controversy may become moot because there is no reason-
able expectation that the alleged violation will recur, and interim relief
or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated the effects of the
alleged violation. ' 400 Because both of these conditions must be satisfied
before a case will be deemed moot and the board had satisfied neither,
the court concluded that the case was not moot. Despite the consent
decree, the court found that the use of racial quotas to exclude blacks
from the schools in question was not precluded. Therefore, since mere
voluntary cessation of the challenged conduct does not moot a contro-
versy, "there remains a reasonable likelihood that the quotas in ques-
tion may again be used to exclude only blacks from [the two
schools]."' ° Second, the court found that neither the consent decree
nor interim events irrevocably eradicated the effects of the alleged vio-
lation. Black students continued to be excluded from their neighbor-
hood schools because of their race and thus the effects of the alleged
violation continue.40 2
Having determined the case was not moot, the Seventh Circuit af-
firmed the denial of the requested injunction, primarily because it felt
bound by its prior ruling. After stating the test-"[w]hen a federal
court of appeals has decided an issue in a case, the court's ruling estab-
lishes law which it itself should apply to the same issues in subsequent
proceedings in that case absent 'unusual and compelling circum-
stances' "4°3-- the court concluded that the decision in Fullilove v. Klutz-
nick,404 does not warrant a departure from the law of the case. "[Tihe
result in Fullilove does not conflict with this court's determination [in
this case] that the use of racial quotas is constitutional in remedial pro-
grams designed to remedy the lingering effects of past
discrimination.' '405
A question of mootness also arose in the context of an action by a
former jail inmate for declaratory relief and compensatory damages
399. 440 U.S. 625 (1979).
400. 664 F.2d at 1071.
401. Id at 1072.
402. See also, Tidwell v. Schweiker, 677 F.2d 560, 564 (7th Cir. 1982), where the court cited
Johnson in holding that a party "does not lose the right to appeal simply because it complies with
an order of the court."
403. 664 F.2d at 1073, quoting United States v. Hoffa, 436 F.2d 1243, 1248 (7th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 1000 (1971).
404. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
405. 664 F.2d at 1073.
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against a sheriff who died subsequent to a judgment in his favor in the
district court.40 6 The succeeding sheriff had been substituted as defend-
ant pursuant to Rule 43(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Proce-
dure. Obviously the new sheriff could not be held personally
responsible for the conduct of the prior sheriff. However, because the
plaintiff sought damages from the defendant in his official capacity and
because "official-capacity suits generally represent only another way of
pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an agent
,"0 the court concluded that the suit for damages was not mooted
by the sheriffs death. The claim for declaratory relief was viewed as a
demand for present or prospective relief and, therefore, found to be
moot.
4 0 8
The court went on to hold that the deprivation of certain reading
materials-pictorial magazines such as Sports Illustrated, Playboy and
Newsweek, newspapers and hardbound books-violated the plaintiff's
due process and first amendment rights.40 9 Since the suit was in es-
sence one against a local governmental entity, and the plaintiff estab-
lished a violation of due process and first amendment rights based on
the former sheriffs enforcement of an official policy, the defendant was
not entitled to invoke a qualified immunity.4 10 The disturbing part of
the case is the court's holding that absent any proof of injury compen-
sable under § 1983, 41t the plaintiff was entitled to only nominal dam-
ages in the amount of one dollar.412 Without any discussion, the court
seems to be equating first amendment violations and violations of sub-
stantive due process with the procedural due process violations in Carey
v. P'phus and concluding that such violations too are worth only one
dollar.41 3
In a class action in which the standing of the named plaintiffs was
at issue, the court very interestingly applied mootness principles to up-
hold their standing.414 The plaintiffs, who had never signed a state
406. Kincaid v. Rusk, 670 F.2d 737 (7th Cir. 1982).
407. Id at 741, quoting from Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.55
(1978).
408. This aspect of the case is somewhat suspect because a declaratory judgment in this con-
text could be viewed as simply establishing liability from which damages could flow.
409. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
410. 670 F.2d at 745; see Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
411. See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
412. 670 F.2d at 745-46.
413. Fortunately, Kincaid is not being treated as definitive on this question. Subsequently, in
Owen v. Lash, 682 F.2d 648, 657-59 (7th Cir. 1982), the court strongly suggested that Carey should
not prohibit presumed damages in cases where substantive constitutional rights have been violated
and remanded the case to the district court for a determination of the issue.
414. Tidwell v. Schweiker, 677 F.2d 560 (7th Cir. 1982).
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form which allowed Illinois to seize the disability payments of persons
confined in state mental institutions and use the proceeds to cover the
cost of institutionalization, brought an action challenging the use of the
form on statutory and constitutional grounds. The court indicated that
it should first determine whether there was standing under Article III
and, if yes, then determine whether the named plaintiffs satisfy the re-
quirements of Rule 23.4 15 It then concluded that the members of a
class can satisfy the personal stake requirement at all stages of the liti-
gation, including the point where standing is determined. 416 This is
true because the "personal stake" required to prevent mootness is the
same as that required for a grant of standing. Because some members
of the class had signed the challenged form and suffered the resulting
injury, there was standing. Extension of the Article III principles es-
tablished in the context of mootness cases to the standing inquiry is
rather novel, however, sound analytically because both mootness and
standing raise the same question of whether or not there is a case or
controversy. 417
The next question was whether the named plaintiffs, who did not
sign the challenged form, are proper class representatives within the
meaning of Rule 23(a).41 8 Here the court found that the "nexus be-
tween the named plaintiffs and those class members actually injured by
Form 623 is sufficient in this case to ensure that the concerns underly-
ing Rule 23 are not undermined. ' 41 9 The nexus is established by the
fact that all patients admitted to the state facility were subjected to an
illegal system of which the challenged form was a significant part.420
3. Immunity
Several immunity questions arose in the context of three consoli-
dated cases brought under two civil rights acts42' by former state court
415. Id. at 566-67.
416. 677 F.2d at 566.
417. Most decisions indicate that the court must first determine whether the named plaintiff
has standing, and then determine the Rule 23(a) questions. See, e.g., the cases cited in C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1766 n.73.1 (1972,
Supp. 1981).
418. Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 23(a). The rule states:
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or
be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous that
joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact common to
the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims
or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class.
419. 677 F.2d at 566.
420. Id at 565.
421. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3) (1976).
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criminal defendants claiming their rights were violated by the use of
perjured testimony.422 First, the court held that four witnesses-three
police officers and a victim of one of the crimes--enjoyed an absolute
immunity from § 1983 liability. While recognizing important consider-
ations weighing against absolute witness immunity,423 the court was
convinced by comments of the Supreme Court in Butz v. Economou 4 24
to the effect that "[a]bsolute immunity is thus necessary to assure that
judges, advocates, and witnesses can perform their respective functions
without harrassment or intimidation. ' 425 In addition, because witnesses
are subject to cross examination and the penalties of perjury, there is
less need for individual suits to enhance the reliability of testimony.
Several prosecuting attorneys who were alleged to knowingly use
perjured testimony and withhold material evidence from the appellate
courts, were found to enjoy absolute immunity under Imbler v.
Pachtman426 because the alleged misconduct is "intimately associated
with the judicial phase of the criminal process. '427 The presiding trial
judge in one of the cases was also protected by absolute immunity be-
cause he was "acting under color of his judicial authority in presiding
over [the] trial and in entering judgment and sentence against [the
criminal defendant]. '428 The judge's court reporters at the criminal
proceedings were extended the protection of absolute judicial immu-
nity because they were discharging their official responsibilities. 429
The final case involving immunity, Colaizzi v. Walker, 430 was al-
ready discussed earlier. 43' It is mentioned again here because the stan-
dards for determining a qualified immunity have been somewhat
modified by the recent Supreme Court decision in Harlow v. Fitzger-
ald.432 In Harlow the Court recognized its decisions have established
that the qualified or good faith immunity defense has both an "objec-
422. Briscoe v. LaHue, 663 F.2d 713 (7th Cir. 1981). After this article went to press, this
decision was affirmed. 103 S. Ct. 1108 (1983).
423. The considerations noted by the court are the following: intimidation caused by the
possibility of civil liability is less of a factor with public officials than lay witnesses, a witness who
is bound to tell the truth exercises no discretion in the performance of a duty to answer fully and
truthfully all questions, and the fact that abuse of the judicial process generally, and perjury and
subornation of perjury specifically, were primary concerns of Congress in passing § 1983. See,
e.g., Briggs v. Goodwin, 569 F.2d 1, 28 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 437 U.S. 904 (1978).
424. 438 U.S. 478, 511-12 (1978).
425. Id at 512.
426. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
427. 663 F.2d at 721-22, quoting Imbler v. Pachtman. 424 U.S. at 430 (White, J., concurring).
428. 663 F.2d at 722.
429. Id
430. 655 F.2d 828 (7th Cir. 1981).
431. See supra notes 94-97 and accompanying text.
432. 102 S. Ct. 2727 (1982).
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tive" and a "subjective" aspect.433 The objective element relates to
whether the official "knew or reasonably should have known that the
action he took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate
the constitutional rights of the [plaintiff];" the subjective element ad-
dresses whether the official "took the action with malicious intention to
cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or other injury. .. .
The Court then noted its dissatisfaction with this test because "the sub-
jective element of the good faith defense frequently has proved incom-
patible with our admonition in Butz that insubstantial claims should
not proceed to trial. ' 435 In other words, the Court was concerned with
the fact that lower courts were regarding the subjective element as cre-
ating a question of fact requiring resolution by a jury. This, of course,
allowed bare allegations of malice to preclude summary judgment and
almost automatically subject public officials to the substantial costs
which attend full litigation. The Court, therefore, concluded:
that bare allegations of malice should not suffice to subject govern-
ment officials either to the costs of trial or to the burdens of broad
reaching discovery. We therefore hold that government officials per-
forming discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability
for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known.436
In essence, the Court has eliminated the subjective element and now
defines the limits of qualified immunity in objective terms only.
The primary impetus for this change seems to be the Court's inter-
est in making possible the resolution of insubstantial claims on sum-
mary judgment.437 No discovery should be allowed until the threshold
immunity question, whether the law was clearly established at the time
of the official's challenged conduct, is resolved. If the law was clearly
established, then the immunity defense would normally fail because
reasonably competent public officials should know the law controlling
their conduct. However, where an official pleading the immunity de-
fense claims extraordinary circumstances and can show that he neither
knew nor should have known of the relevant clearly established law,
then the immunity defense should be sustained.438 Under this stan-
dard, summary judgment in Colaizzi would have been appropriate if
433. Id at 2737.
434. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 321-22 (1975).
435. 102 S. Ct. at 2737.
436. Id at 2738.
437. Id at 2739.
438. Id
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the due process law relied upon by the plaintiff was not clearly estab-
lished when the relevant acts took place.
After this article went to press, the Supreme Court handed down two
significant decisions regarding issues discussed in the text. Although
brief footnote reference was made to these opinions, further elabora-
tion follows:
In Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 103 S. Ct.
948 (1983), the Supreme Court overturned the Seventh Circuit deci-
sion, discussed at pages 605-607, supra. It rejected the appellate court's
analysis of this case as an equal access problem where a particular
viewpoint was being discriminated against. Instead it held, in a 5-4
opinion, that the case did not involve a public forum or even a "limited
public forum;" therefore, the policy only had to be reasonable. The
Court found no indication that the school board intended to discourage
one viewpoint and advance another; instead they found the access pol-
icy was based on the status of the unions. The differential access was
reasonable because it was consistent with the district's legitimate inter-
est in preserving the property for the use to which it was lawfully in-
tended, ije., it enabled the recognized union to perform its obligation as
the exclusive representative of all Perry Township teachers. Having
failed to recognize a viable first amendment argument, the Court sum-
marily rejected the equal protection claim. Since the policy did not
burden a fundamental right of the minority union, the school district
policy only needed to rationally further a legitimate state interest. Note
that the four dissenters agreed with the Seventh Circuit analysis that
the exclusive access policy amounted to "viewpoint discrimination"
that impermissibly infringed on the union's first amendment rights. Id
at 960.
Reaching the same conclusion as the Seventh Circuit, discussed at
pages 637-40, the Supreme Court in EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct.
1054 (1983), narrowly upheld the extension of ADEA against a tenth
amendment claim. Assuming that congress acted under the commerce
clause in extending ADEA to cover state and local governments, the
five judge majority proceeded to apply the three-prong Hodel analysis.
The Court concluded that the third prong was not met, i e., the act did
not "directly impair" the state's ability to "structure integral operations
in areas of traditional government functions." Id at -. The Court
concluded that the degree of federal intrusion was sufficiently less seri-
ous than in the National League of Cities case so as to justify upholding
the provision. The following differences were noted: (1) ADEA simply
requires states to achieve its goals in a more individualized and careful
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manner than would otherwise be the case; (2) the state may defend
ADEA claims by showing that age is a "bona fide occupational qualifi-
cation," within the meaning of the act; (3) ADEA will not have sub-
stantial consequential effects on state decisionmaking, such as the
allocation of state financial resources. Id at 1062.
